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Anglo-American jurisprudence, because of its common law tradition,
has focused on the variety of law-giving roles that courts play. In the
process of adjudication, courts regularly perform a rulemaking as well
as a dispute-resolution function.' Legislation is similarly bifocused.
Some laws are intended to provide specific instructions about particular
conduct, which is to be sanctioned in designated ways. But much
legislation is more broadly rulemaking, intended instead to provide
guideposts for reasoned decisionmaking by those entrusted with judicial
administration.2 Broadly drafted statutes are perhaps most familiar in
the context of *enabling legislation for administrative agencies. Com-
mercial statutes, particularly commercial codes, may also be seen as
enabling legislation, providing a presumptive framework for private or
official rulemaking, rather than as binding rules that determine, by
statutory fiat, the outcome of precisely specified confrontations. 3
In the American history of the codification of commercial law, "uni-
form" statutes have been drafted in both styles. The Uniform Sales
Act 4 was an open-ended restatement of common law sales principles,
* A table of citations to the Uniform Commercial Code may be found at the end of
this article. The Code will hereinafter be cited by section number only. References to
Article 9 will be to the 1972 (rather than the 1962) Official Text, unless otherwise stated.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford University.
+ Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. See Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rule-
Making, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976).
2. The universally uneasy relationship between legislation and judicial lawmaking is
reviewed in a recent article focusing on the confrontation between the California Civil
Code and the developing case law of comparative negligence. See Englard, Li v. Yellow
Cab Co.-A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the California Civil Code, 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 4 (1977).
3. See Gilmore, Comninercial Law in the United States: Its Codification and Other
Misadventures, in AsPEcTs OF COMPARATIVe COMMERCIAL LAW: SALES, CONSUMER CREDIT, AND
SECURED TRANSACIONS 449 (J. Ziegel & W. Foster eds. 1969).
4. The Uniform Sales Act, which was modeled on the British Sale of Goods Act, was
approved and recommended for adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners
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while the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law5 contained detailed
commands about the determination of negotiability and its conse-
quences. Each model has its problems: predictably, the Sales Act was
often ignored, while the Negotiable Instruments Law was often burden-
some. The Uniform Commercial Code continues this pattern of eclec-
ticism, putting together articles of markedly different styles and aspira-
tions. For example, Article 5, on letters of credit, is hardly a codifica-
tion at all,6 while Article 3, on commercial paper, continues the
peremptory style of prior learning on negotiable instruments. 7 Whether
or not a Code so divided will survive is a question that only time will
answer, although it is worth noting that Article 5 has already proven
adaptable to an entirely new form of credit, known as a stand-by credit,
while Article 3 must be revised to accommodate electronic innovation.
Inevitably, some factual patterns give rise to conflicts that eclecticism
cannot dissipate. One transaction that recurrently crosses article lines
is a contract for the sale of goods that can either become, or come into
confrontation with, a security interest. Article 2, the sales article, con-
sistent with its historical antecedents and responsive to its applicability
to conspicuously diverse commercial interactions, leans heavily to state-
ments of principle and presumptive guidelines. Its pattern is to define
a few core concepts with core consequences, which are then located in
a broader network of open-ended constructs with multifaceted implica-
tions.8 It is, in sum, a rulemaking statute in the common law tradition.
on Uniform State Laws in 1906. It was ultimately adopted in 36 states and the District of
Columbia; most of these adoptions came in the 1910s and 1920s. The Act has now every-
where been superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code.
5. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, familiarly known as the NIL, was
modeled on the British Bills of Exchange Act, and was approved and recommended for
adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1896.
The NIL was the Commissioners' first important statute, and their most successful; it
was adopted in every state, the last being Georgia in 1924. The NIL has now everywhere
been superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code. Even in Louisiana, which has resisted
enactment of the Code in its entirety, enactment of Articles 1, 3, 4, and 5 has displaced
the NIL. See 4 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to 1-209, 3-101 to 5-117 (West Supp. 1977).
6. The scope section of Article 5, § 5-102, is extraordinarily gingerly in defining its
authority. Subsection (3) provides:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of
credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereafter
develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or
negate application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not provided for or
to a person not specified by this Article.
7. The sections of Article 3, in contrast with those of Article 2, only rarely contain the
prefatory words "unless otherwise agreed." The basic scope section, § 3-104, provides in
subsection (1) that "[a]ny writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
[meet specified requirements of form]." (Emphasis added).
8. For example, the pattern of remedies available to parties aggrieved by breach of a
sales contract is set by the assumption that most sales contracts are negotiated and per-
formed (or not performed) against the background of a functioning marketplace for the
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Article 9, the secured transactions article, consistent with its historical
antecedents and responsive to the unitary but absolute requirement that
security interests survive attack in bankruptcy, leans heavily to positivist
prescription of rules that dictate outcomes. Its primary function is to
assure secured creditors that they can defeat lien creditors, since the
rights of lien creditors furnish the basic test that determines the upset
powers of the trustee in bankruptcy9 (and of the assessor of federal tax
liens, another formidable foe10). Pre-Code litigation taught incontro-
vertibly that protection in bankruptcy could not be assured through
indeterminate solutions." The pattern for Article 9 was thus set by the
inexorable demand to deal dispositively with lien creditors. This pat-
tern not only shaped the provisions of Article 9 on perfection, which
determine the rights of lien creditors, but also affected with equal rigor
the form of provisions on priority among other competing claimants to
collateral. Thus the difference in orientation between Articles 2 and 9
is pervasive. There is some attempt at accommodation in the principal
bridging section, section 9-113,12 but that section, while acknowledging
the likelihood that commercial transactions will encounter inconsistent
regulation under the two articles, offers guidance that is too skeletonic
and imprecise to resolve the varieties of conflict that regularly arise.
Nowhere else is there a systematic effort to mesh the two articles or to
cope with their differing orientations and styles.
The most rudimentary commercial contract readily illustrates that
contract goods and goods like them. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating
to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadinap for Article Two,
73 YA t L.J. 199, 253-68 (1963). When Article 2 has tried to draw a hard line, as between
disclaimers and clauses limiting liability for default, it has been notoriously unsuccessful.
See, e.g., Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 SAV.2d 307
(1970); Adams v. J.1. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
9. Section 9-301(3) of the Code includes in its definition of a "lien creditor" "a trustee
in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition." The Bankruptcy Act, in turn.
gives the trustee in bankruptcy upset powers measured by the rights of a creditor who, on
the date of bankruptcy, had obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings. Bankruptcy
Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970). The Bankruptcy Act tests transactions as preferential,
when they involve property other than real property, by asking whether a subsequent
lien obtained by legal or equitable proceedings could have become "superior." Id. § 60(a),
11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
10. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 defines a valid security interest as one that "has
become protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an
unsecured obligation." I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1).
11. The case of First Nat'l Bank v. O'Keefe (In re New Haven Clock & Watch Co.),
253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958), is an especially horrendous example. Despite meticulous
procedures designed to conform to accepted practices and local law, the secured creditor
was required to defend his financing arrangement, an assignment of accounts receivable,
before a bankruptcy referee, a federal district court, and a court of appeals. The secured
creditor ultimately prevailed, but at considerable expense in litigation.
12. The language and the significance of § 9-113 will be explored in detail below.
Other sections of the Code that relate Articles 2 and 9 include §§ 2-401 and 2-403.
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interactions between Articles 2 and 9 need be neither complex nor
esoteric. Consider a simple contract for the sale of chattels. ABC
Manufacturing Corporation agrees with Family Furniture Mart, Inc.,
to manufacture and deliver in a single shipment 500 adequately
described living room sofas."a It is likely that ABC's manufacturing
process will, at some point, generate output capable of being earmarked
as that destined for Family Furniture.14 Any number of commercial
parties involved with Family Furniture may then assert an interest in
the sofas. Family Furniture may previously have contracted with a
secured creditor who took, for value, an effective and perfected Article
9 security interest in Family Furniture's present and future inventory.'.
Family Furniture will expect to make sales of furniture to its cus-
tomers, who may buy for cash, on time, or with funds obtained through
independent secured financing.'0 Family Furniture is also likely to
have trade creditors on the lookout for new assets to subject to judicial
liens.17 On the other side, ABC Manufacturing is apt to have com-
mercial relationships with buyers other than Family Furniture. The
Uniform Commercial Code assumes in Article 2 that sellers like ABC
have ready access to a resale market.' 8 ABC may sell the sofas on that
market despite its contract with Family Furniture, 9 or as a way of
working out disputes that arise out of their contract.20 Thus even under
the most ordinary circumstances, virtually any sales contract may gen-
13. It will be assumed that the ABC-Family Furniture contract meets the Statute of
Frauds requirements of § 2-201.
14. Section 2-501(1) provides that the buyer obtains "a special property and an in-
surable interest in goods" when they become identified to the contract. For goods not in
existence when the contract is made, identification occurs, unless otherwise explicitly
agreed, "when goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to
which the contract refers." Section 2-501(l)(b).
15. Article 9 permits security agreements that encompass after-acquired as well as
present collateral. See §§ 9-203, 9-204.
16. Article 9 repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), under which
the validity of a security agreement turned on the debtor's accountability for secured
collateral. See § 9-205; id., Comment 1. In inventory financing, the expected commercial
pattern is the sale of the secured collateral, with the security interest then shifting to the
proceeds of the sale. See § 9-306.
17. Whenever a debtor acquires rights in collateral, creditors may bargain for a
voluntary transfer or insist on an involuntary transfer. See § 9-311.
18. The seller is entitled to recover the price from a defaulting buyer only where the
goods have been accepted or damaged after the risk of loss has passed to the buyer.
Ordinarily, the seller is expected to resell. See § 2-709(2).
19. A seller who, like ABC, is a merchant, see § 2-104(1), can resell goods in his pos-
session so as to pass good title to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, despite a
pre-existing contract of sale. See § 2-403(2).




erate a significant array of competing claims; the claimants described
above in no way exhaust the possibilities.
21
The law that governs competing interests in the ABC-Family Furni-
ture contract is the law of Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. ABC is an Article 2 seller, -2 2 probably an Article 2 merchant,
23
and possibly, as section 9-113 provides, a person with "[a] security in-
terest arising solely under the Article on Sales" that is nonetheless
"subject to the provisions of [Article 9].'-4 Family Furniture is an
Article 2 buyer, 2 and may be an Article 9 debtor,20 as well as an Article
9 seller and a transferor of chattel paper. As one might expect, these
various roles carry different implications about rights in the sofas,
which are goods under Article 227 and collateral under Article 9.2 8
Necessarily, rules about rights in the "property" transferred by the
21. ABC may have unpaid creditors, who may levy on goods in ABC's possession
despite the existence of a contract for their sale. See § 2-402. Consignment arrangements,
see §§ 2-326, 2-327, 9-114, may occasion further complexities.
22. Section 2-l03(l)(d) provides:
"Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods.
23. Section 2-104(1) provides:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be at-
tributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
24. Section 9-113 provides:
Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable;
and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).
25. Section 2-103(l)(a) provides:
"Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.
26. Section 9-105(l)(d) provides:
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation
secured, whether or not lie owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller
of accounts or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are
not the same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral in any
provision of the Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any provision deal-
ing with the obligation, and may include both where the context so requires ....
27. Section 2-105(1) provides:
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.
"Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other
identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed
from realty (Section 2-107).
28. Section 9-105(l)(c) provides:
"Collateral" means the property subject to a security interest, and includes accounts
and chattel paper which have been sold ....
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sales contract impinge also on claims for monetary damages between
ABC and Family Furniture, but monetary claims will not be central to
our discussion here.
2 9
Despite their conspicuous differences, Articles 2 and 9 share one im-
portant principle. Both articles explicitly renounce reliance on the
metaphysics of "title" 0 and look instead to factual signposts as em-
pirical guides to commercial relationships. 31 For both articles, physical
location of contract goods is a significant indicator of statutory rights,
particularly when third-party interests are at stake.32 It therefore seems
29. Monetary claims are likely to present difficulties of their own arising out of con-
flicting instructions under Article 2 and Article 9. For example, consider the problem that
arises if a buyer disputes the amount of his monetary obligation on the ground that some
part of the seller's performance under the contract has been nonconforming. Such a buyer,
upon giving adequate notice, is entitled to elect to keep defective goods, see § 2-607(3),
and to pursue a claim for damages measured by §§ 2-714 and 2-715.
Under Article 2, the buyer may enforce his claim for damages by withholding payment
from the seller. Section 2-717 provides:
The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so may deduct all or any
part of the damages resulting from any breach of the contract from any part of the
price still due under the same contract.
This section means that failure by the buyer to pay in full, while the amount of the
offset for damages is in dispute, is not a breach by the buyer, and does not privilege
countermeasures by the disappointed seller. The section codifies the common law position
of cases like Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co., 314 Mass. 592, 50 N.E.2d 962 (1943).
Possibly excessive withholding by the buyer might trigger a seller's right to request
adequate assurance of performance under § 2-609, but that section would, at most, permit
suspension of further performance by the seller.
By contrast, Article 9 allows a seller who is a secured party to invoke draconian mea-
sures, such as repossession of collateral, whenever the debtor (the buyer) is in default. See
§ 9-503. Article 9 does not in terms define default. Consistent reading of §§ 9-501, 9-502,
and 9-503 suggests strongly that default is determined by the terms of the security agree-
ment. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1190-95 (1965). It is
standard learning that security agreements unconditionally make nonpa)ment of any in-
stallment when due an event of default, regardless of the bona fides of the buyer's
reasons for nonpayment. See R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORI
COMMERCIAL CODE 235-36 (1973). Article 9 may, therefore, make it impossible for a buyer
who has signed a security agreement to exercise rights given to him by Article 2, even
though Article 9, in § 9-206(2), expressly preserves the substantive claims on which the
buyer's rights are most apt to be premised.
There has been remarkably little litigation to test resolution of this conflict between
Articles 2 and 9. The issue was in fact raised in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 n.17
(1972); id. at 99-103 (White, J., dissenting), but was not reached, since the Court found
fatal defects in the process by which repossession had been accomplished. Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), decided during the same term of the Court, and cited in the
Fuentes case, allowed a limited hearing on limited issues (had the tenant defaulted on
the rent?) to pass constitutional muster. Whatever may be the magnitude of the constitu-
tional due process requirement for a hearing before definitive dispossession, the common
law question of the underlying contract rights is yet to be seriously examined.
30. See §§ 2-401, 9-202.
31. For a discussion of some of these empirical guides tinder Article 2, see Peters, supra
note 8. Article 9 rules vary (as under § 9-103) with types of collateral, rather than with
the form in which a security agreement is cast. See § 9-102(2).
32. See, e.g., the rules on risk of loss in Article 2, §§ 2-509 and 2-510, and on the role
of possession in perfection in Article 9, §§ 9-205, 9-301(2), and 9-305.
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useful to analyze the ABC-Family Furniture contract in each of the
following circumstances:
(1) ABC never delivers the contract goods to Family Furniture;
(2) ABC unconditionally delivers the contract goods to Family
Furniture;
(3) ABC delivers the contract goods on special condition to Family
Furniture; and
(4) ABC regains possession of the contract goods from Family
Furniture.
In each case it will be assumed that ABC has chosen not to enter into
an Article 9 secured transaction of normal configuration in its dealings
with Family Furniture.: We propose to explore the costs and risks of
that choice, to determine the urgency with which all unpaid sellers
ought to contemplate conversion into secured lenders. (We do not
mean to suggest, of course, that secured lending is any kind of panacea;
its trade-offs are well recognized, and dissimilar 3 4) In order to do so,
we will use the following frame of reference, suggested by the cus-
tomary law of secured lending, to test the rights of an unpaid seller at
each of the four stages of the sales transaction:
(1) the validity of the unpaid seller's proprietary claim against
anyone;
(2) the perfection of the unpaid seller's claim against lien creditors;
(3) the enforceability of the unpaid seller's interest against the sold
goods because of the buyer's default;
(4) the priority of the unpaid seller's rights against other takers
from the buyer.
This framework emphasizes Article 9's great strength: its recognition
that different kinds of competing claims should be adjudicated by
different standards, that security interests need not rise or fall as unitary
entities. We propose to investigate the claims of the unpaid seller as a
medium for infusing the flexibility of Article 2 into the categorical
rulemaking of Article 9.
33. It is clear that a seller of goods has the capacity to reserve or acquire a security
interest under §§ 1-201(37) and 9-102.
34. The perfected secured creditor faces a variety of competitors for priority under
§§ 9-307 to 9-316. His rights on default are limited by the provisions of Part 5 of Article 9.
But on perfection he has rights superior to those of a stfbsequent lien creditor, including
a trustee in bankruptcy. See § 9-301. See generally G. GILMORE, supra note 29.
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I. The Validity of the Unpaid Seller's Proprietary Claim to Sold
Goods
The unpaid seller was entitled at common law and under the Sales
Act to a possessory lien on sold goods. As Williston put it:
The ground upon which an unpaid seller is allowed a lien and
kindred remedies is the inherent injustice of depriving him of
goods with which he has not finally parted where it is evident that
he has not been or will not be paid the price for them when it is
due. 5
The seller's common law lien attached automatically when the seller
became unpaid and terminated automatically when the seller delivered
the contract goods to the buyer or the buyer's agent. At common law,
then, ABC would have had a seller's lien before delivery to Family
Furniture and would have become an unsecured creditor without a lien
thereaftera,
A. ABC in Possession Before Delivery
The Uniform Commercial Code has no specific counterpart to the
provisions of the Sales Act on seller's liens. Article 2 characteristically
eschews the language of "lien" and instead includes, in section 2-703's
laundry list of seller's remedies upon buyer's breach, the rights of an
"aggrieved" seller to "withhold delivery" and to "cancel."' 7 ABC's
rights are not appreciably affected by this change in nomenclature.
Clearly, ABC can "withhold delivery" only of goods within its control.
The seller's rights over goods appropriately "withheld," which we will
35. 3 S. WIaSToN, THE LAW GOVERNIN, SALES OF GooDs AT COzMMON LAW AND UNDER
THE UNIFORM SALES AcT 99 (rev. ed. 1948).
36. The Uniform Sales Act, in §§ 52-56 and §§ 61-62, codified the common law without
substantial change.
37. Section 2-703 provides:
Seller's Remedies in General
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make
a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part or the whole,
then with respect to any goods directly affected and, if the breach is of the whole
contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole undelivered balance, the
aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided (Section 2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified to the con-
tract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Section 2-706);
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explore below in the section on enforceability,38 are very much like
those that inhere in a seller's common law lien. Similar constraints in
fact limit the right to "cancel," which appears at first glance to promise
a substantial expansion of ABC's pre-Code position. Although the text
of section 2-703 does not expressly require that the seller be in posses-
sion of the goods in order to assert his right to cancel, other sections in
Article 2 imply such limitations.3 9 The section governing replevin of
sold goods affords rights to an aggrieved buyer rather than to an ag-
grieved seller;40 there is no general authority anywhere in Article 2
for the unpaid seller to retake goods from the buyer after delivery.4 '
Two exceptional cases, the cash sale -4 2 and the sale induced by mis-
38. See pp. 942-47 infra.
39. See Peters, supra note 8, at 216-22 (describing implications of seller's right to cancel).
The term "cancellation" is defined in § 2-106(4):
"Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by
the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that the cancelling
party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed
balance.
The general remedial implications, or nonimplications, of cancellation are further spelled
out in § 2-720:
Effect of "Cancellation" or "Rescission" on Claims for Antecedent Breach
Unless the contrary intention clearly appears, expressions of "cancellation" or
"rescission" of the contract or the like shall not be construed as a renunciation or dis-
charge of any claim in damages for an antecedent breach.
40. The relevant section, § 2-716, is headed "Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or
Replevin." (Emphasis added.) Although headings are often not formally enacted, they are
nonetheless suggestive. Furthermore, § 2-716 is one of the sections referred to in § 2-711,
which lists the buyer's remedies in general. The text of § 2-716 provides:
Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or Replevin
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other
proper circumstances.
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as
to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after
reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has been
made or tendered.
41. The section that lists the seller's remedies in general, § 2-703, contains no mention
of a right of replevin. It does not even refer to the special cases of reclamation, §§ 2-507
and 2-702. It is possible, however, to argue that a general right of replevin is saved by
§ 1-103, which provides:
Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
The difficulty with this argument is that neither the common law in general nor the law
merchant in particular gave the unpaid seller a continuing lien on goods in his buyer's
possession. E.g., Southern Lumber Co. v. Colvin, 104 Ark. 130, 148 S.W. 496 (1912); see
R. NoRDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES 498-500 (1970).
42. The cash sale transaction is discussed in detail below. See pp. 922-30 infra. The
text of § 2-507(2) strongly implies a right to reclaim:
Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or docu-
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representation of solvency,43 do give rise to special rights to retake. But
their exceptional nature and the stringent conditions by which they are
hedged underline the absence of a general nonpossessory lien.
Article 9, surprisingly, more closely approximates the linguistic
structure of the Uniform Sales Act than that of Article 2. The pro-
prietary rights of the unpaid seller are primarily codified, under
Article 9, in section 9-113. That section, added long after the basic
drafting of Article 9 had been completed, bridges Article 2 and Article
9 by positing the existence of a "security interest arising solely under
the Article on Sales. ' 44 The absence in the article on sales of a clearly
demarcated class of Article 2 security interests either went unnoticed
or was thought irrelevant. Undaunted by the ambiguity of their ref-
erent, the drafters of Article 9 determined that, whatever "arising
solely" might encompass, the resultant interest was a security interest
under Article 9. The consequent applicability of the rules and require-
ments of Article 9 might, however, be suspended "to the extent that
and so long as the buyer does not have or does not lawfully obtain
possession of the goods." Suspension, under section 9-113, affects ques-
tions of validity, perfection, and enforcement; significantly, it does not
affect questions of priority. Nor, of course, does that suspension signif-
icantly undermine the basic determination of section 9-113 to look to
Article 9 rather than to Article 2 as the first source of learning on
borderline transactions.
Whatever the scope of "security interest arising solely under the
Article on Sales" might be, undoubtedly the common law seller's lien
ments of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is condi-
tional upon his making the payment due.
(Emphasis added.)
43. The sale on credit induccd by misrepresentation of solvency is discussed in detail
below. See pp. 922-30 infra. Section 2-702(2) expressly provides a right to reclaim:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while in-
solvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller
in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods
on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to
pay.
44. Section 9-113 provides:
Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable;
and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).
Section 9-113 first appeared in the 1957 Official Text of the Code.
916
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must be the paradigmatic security interest so arising. What other com-
mercial interest more closely resembles a security interest and yet
describes special claims of a seller that obtain "to the extent that and
so long as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain posses-
sion of the goods"? If the unpaid seller continues in possession of sold
goods, it is logical to validate his claim to the goods regardless of how
his interest is characterized. Where Article 2 permits continued "with-
holding" of goods from a repudiating or defaulting buyer, it would be
wrongheaded to devalue the seller's rights merely because of a reflexive
characterization of his interest as an Article 9 security interest. Sec-
tion 9-113 obviates this danger by expressly waiving the Article 9
requirement of a written security agreement for a seller in possession.45
This waiver, while clarifying and sensible, is in fact superfluous. Even
under Article 9, the requirement of a written security agreement is
waived whenever the secured party is in possession of the collateral. 46
As a pledgee, ABC needs no further Article 9 credentials to have a
valid security interest.
It is fortunate that, terminology apart, both Article 2 and Article 9
continue the validity of the seller's possessory lien, since Article 2, at
least, also continues the common law implications of this lien for sub-
sequent takers from the seller. If ABC resells the sofas, either out of
spite or because it is aggrieved by Family Furniture's misconduct,
buyers in the ordinary course of business from ABC get good title under
section 2-403. 47 Although it might be possible to treat differently the
claims of ABC and those of ABC's customers, consistent resolution is
obviously preferable.
B. ABC Delivers Goods Unconditionally
If the seller's possessory lien is the paradigmatic interest validated by
section 9-113, the seller's putative claim after unconditional delivery to
45. Section 9-113(a).
46. Section 9-203(1)(a).
47. The relevant provisions of § 2-403 apply if ABC is a merchant, as defined in
§ 2-104(1), and if the buyer is a buyer in the ordinary course of business, as defined in
§ 1-201(9). Section 2-403 then provides, in the refevant subsections:
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of pos-
session regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or
acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the pos-
sessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal
law.
Under these provisions, the issue is the possessory seller's power to resell, rather than the
seller's actual or implied authority to do so.
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the buyer is the interest that is with equal rigor invalidated. Even as-
suming that the seller could conjure up a security interest arising under
Article 2, the ameliorative provisions of section 9-113 apply only "so
long as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession
of the goods"; after unconditional delivery, ABC hasn't a leg to stand
on.48 Validity under Article 9, apart from the possessory shelter of
Article 2, requires a written security agreement4 9 evidencing a kind of
agreement that will not remotely have crossed the minds of either ABC
or Family Furniture in the context of an open-credit sale. Even if a
written contract of sale could be distorted into compliance with Article
9, an unlikely eventuality,"° further problems of perfection, enforce-
ment, and priority would confirm the common law position that sur-
render of goods usually signals the end of the seller's proprietary claim.
Some way stations were developed at common law that, under certain
circumstances, allowed delivery to be conditional and thus reversible.
One of these was the conditional sale, a sale on credit coupled with the
stipulation that title was reserved in the seller until the contract price
was fully paid.51 In most states, the condition reserving title was effec-
tive not only against the buyer himself, but also against purchasers
from, and creditors of, the buyer. During the first half of this century,
this special protection of the conditional seller was gradually eroded,
and recording of the conditional sales contract came to be required,
at least to defeat innocent third-party claimants. 52
48. Of course ABC might negotiate for an ordinary Article 9 security interest to pre-
serve its claims after delivery; it is assumed throughout that this option has not been
exercised.
49. Section 9-203.
50. Under § 9-203, a nonpossessory security interest requires a written security agree-
ment, signed by the debtor, that describes the collateral. A contract of sale might well
furnish an adequate description, and memorialize an agreement, but it would probably
not be a security agreement. That term is defined in § 9-105(l)(4 as "an agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest." See, e.g., In re Shelton, 472 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir.
1973); In re Mitchell, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972). Parol evidence might suggest that a
security agreement was intended, see, e.g., Peterson v. Ziegler, 39 Ill. App. 3d 379, 350
N.E.2d 356 (1976), but intent to provide security is not lightly to be implied. See, e.g.,
Tate v. Gallagher, 116 N.H. 165, 355 A.2d 417 (1976).
51. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 68-85; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 265-309.
52. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 68. A uniform statute on conditional sales, the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, was approved and recommended for adoption by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1918. It was adopted in
only 12 jurisdictions and is now superseded by the Code. Section 5 of the Act provided:
Conditional sales void as to certain persons. Every provision in a conditional sale
reserving property in the seller, shall be void as to any purchaser from or creditor
of the buyer, who, without notice of such provision, purchases the goods or acquires
by attachment or levy a lien upon them, before the contract or a copy thereof shall be
filed as hereinafter provided, unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days
after the making of the conditional sale.
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Today the seller of goods who seeks protection by dint of a contract
reserving title is not in a substantially different position than any other
seller upon delivery to the buyer. In Article 2, the seller encounters the
drafters' general aversion to rights turning on claims of title. Section
2-401, which opens with a preamble disassociating "the rights, obliga-
tions and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third
parties" from title, relegates the conditional seller to the inhospitable
turf of Article 9. "Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title
(property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect
to a reservation of a security interest." This limitation endows the
buyer, upon delivery, with the status of a secured debtor under Article
9 and allows the debtor and takers under the debtor to impose all of
the customary Article 9 constraints upon secured sellers5 4 Whether a
seller reserving a security interest arising under Article 2 or a "regular"
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr § 5. Many states that did not adopt the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act enacted local laws of similar import. See 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at
743-55.
53. The relevant parts of § 2-401 provide:
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies of
the seller, the bu)er, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title to
the goods except where the provision refers to such title. Insofar as situations are not
covered by tie other provisions of this Article and matters concerning title become
material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identification
to the contract (Section 2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer ac-
quires by their identification a special property as limited by this Act. Any retention
or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to
the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest. Subject to these
provisions and to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9),
title to goods passes from the seller to the buer in any manner and on any condi-
tions explicitly agreed on by the parties.
54. The definition of "security interest" in § 1-201(37) expressly incorporates the
provisions of § 2-401. The subsection states:
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by a
seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is
limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest". The term also includes any
interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9. The
special property interest of a bu)er of goods on identification of such goods to a con-
tract for sale under Section 2-401 is not a "security interest", but a buyer may also
acquire a "security interest" by complying with Article 9. Unless a lease or consign-
ment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a "security in-
terest" but a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions on consignment
sales (Section 2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by
the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of
itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon com-
pliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to be-
come the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal con-
sideration does make the lease one intended for security.
Article 9 incorporates this definition into its scope section, § 9-102. Subsection (2) of
§ 9-102 contains an illustrative list of security interests created by contract; that list in-
cludes "conditional sale."
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secured party under Article 9 denied special shelter under Article 2,
ABC cannot avoid the majority of Article 9 problems. True, the reserva-
tion of title, if in writing and signed by the buyer, is likely to have
enough descriptive content to qualify as a security agreement.i5 How-
ever, the buyer's possession under a conditional sale requires perfection
by filing of ABC's security interest and implicates the Article 9 default
rules, to be discussed below, in exactly the same way as any uncondi-
tional delivery. 56
On occasion sellers may temporize by initiating a process of delivery
that postpones the total relinquishment of possession to the buyer. The
seller who receives derogatory information about his buyer's credit-
worthiness may stop delivery of goods in transit and thereby regain his
possessory stance.57 The seller who ships goods "under reservation,"
55. Section 9-203.
56. The array of instructions from § 1-201(37) to § 2-401 to § 9-102 probably means
that the interest of a conditional seller is not a security interest arising "solely" under the
Article on Sales, as § 9-113 requires. An Article 9 security interest of the ordinary kind
must be perfected by filing a financing statement, see §§ 9-401 to 9-408, and enforced by
protective default rules, see §§ 9-501 to 9-507. In the case of a security interest that does
arise "solely" under Article 2, the ordinary Article 9 rules are suspended "to the extent
that and so long as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the
goods." Section 9-113. This suspension would surely not apply, even if a conditional sale
contract were to qualify under § 9-113, once goods were delivered to the buyer. A buyer's
possession subject to a seller's "retention or reservation ... of ... title," § 2-401, is
authorized and lawful possession. The rules of perfection and default are therefore the
same whether the conditional seller comes into Article 9 via § 9-102 or via § 9-113.
57. Section 2-705 provides:
Seller's Stoppage of Delivery in Transit or Otherwise
(1) The seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier or other
bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent (Section 2-702) and may stop de-
livery of carload, truckload, planeload or larger shipments of express or freight when
the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due before delivery or if for any
other reason the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim the goods.
(2) As against such buyer the seller may stop delivery until
(a) receipt of the goods by the buyer; or
(b) acknowledgment to the buyer by any bailee of the goods except a carrier
that the bailee holds the goods for the buyer; or
(c) such acknowledgment to the buyer by a carrier by reshipment or as ware-
houseman; or
(d) negotiation to the buyer of any negotiable document of title covering the
goods.
(3) (a) To stop delivery the seller must so notify as to enable the bailee by reason-
able diligence to prevent delivery of the goods.
(b) After such notification the bailee must hold and delher the goods accord-
ing to the directions of the seller but the seller is liable to the bailee for any
ensuing charges or damages.
(c) If a negotiable document of title has been issued for goods the bailee is not
obliged to obey a notification to stop until surrender of the document.
(d) A carrier who has issued a non-negotiable bill of lading is not obliged to
obey a notification to stop received from a person other than the con-
signor.
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typically by procuring a negotiable bill of lading to his own order
covering the contract goods, in effect retains control over the goods
until the document is tendered and accepted.5s Such a seller has, while
he holds the document, another form of security interest "arising solely
under the Article on Sales."' 9 If the buyer never obtains possession in
either of these cases, the seller's position should be the same as if the
seller had remained totally in possession ab initio.
These seller's options are essentially variations on the theme of
delivery and possession. Until there is delivery, the seller can retain
possession with minimal interference, regardless of how his interest is
characterized; a seller who is especially risk averse, and who has the
market power to do so, can refuse any delivery until full payment of
the contract price. Delivery dramatically increases the seller's vulner-
ability to competing claims by subjecting him to the Article 9 rules on
secured creditors, which provide little comfort for ordinary sellers. The
question remains whether there are any circumstances in which the
buyer's possession is so limited, his rights so ephemeral, that the seller
should be entitled to extricate himself from the disastrous consequences
that otherwise attend his nonpossessory status, whether or not he holds
an Article 2 security interest. Two candidates that emerge for special
treatment, under both the common law of sales and the provisions of
Article 2, are the cash sale and the credit sale fraudulently induced by
misrepresentation of solvency. Although neither of these transactions
was treated under common law as coming within seller's liens, each did
58. Section 2-505 provides:
Seller's Shipment Under Reservation
(1) Where the seller has identified goods to the contract by or before shipment:
(a) his procurement of a negotiable bill of lading to his own order or otherwise
reserves in him a security interest in the goods. His procurement of the bill
to the order of a financing agency or of the buyer indicates in addition only
the seller's expectation of transferring that interest to the person named.
(b) a non-negotiable bill of lading to himself or his nominee reserves possession
of the goods as security but except in a case of conditional delivery (sub-
section (2) of Section 2-507) a non-negotiable bill of lading naming the buyer
as consignee reserves no security interest even though the seller retains
possession of the bill of lading.
(2) When shipment by the seller with reservation of a security interest is in viola-
tion of the contract for sale it constitutes an improper contract for transportation
within the preceding section but impairs neither the rights given to the buyer by
shipment and identification of the goods to the contract nor the seller's powers as a
holder of a negotiable document.
59. Section 9-113. Comment 1 to § 9-113 provides a variety of clues to the coverage of
. 9-113, some of which appear to tie § 9-113 to particular language of "security interest"
in Article 2, others of which appear to pursue a more functional analysis. Although we
are inclined to disagree with inclusion of conditional sales, see note 56 supra, we note the
Comment's more plausible references to §§ 2-505, 2-703, 2-705, and 2-706.
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permit a seller who acted promptly and properly to replevy goods from
a buyer in possession.6
0
C. ABC Delivers Goods on Special Condition
The contours of the two sales on special condition were well devel-
oped at common law. The cash sale was a transaction in which the
parties were said to have contemplated a simultaneous exchange of the
goods for the contract price." Under a cash sale, no title ever passed to
the buyer until payment was made, and the retaking seller was there-
fore entitled to retake his property when payment was not forthcoming.
To exercise his right to retake, the cash seller was required to act speed-
ily, for acquiescence in the buyer's possession despite nonpayment
rapidly turned the transaction into a credit sale and the seller into an
unsecured creditor.'* Similarly, the cash seller could not entrust his
unpaying buyer with "indicia of ownership" that might indicate more
than a claim to merely temporary possession, without again losing the
60. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 64; Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of
Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1060 (1954). AX common law it was understood
that the cash sale was to be distinguished from the conditional sale, on the basis that
in a cash sale no right of possession is contemplated until the price is paid; whereas, in
a conditional sale the buyer is expected to hai e possession as soon as the bargain is
made. The cash sale contemplates no credit; the conditional sale contemplates credit
as far as the possession and use of the goods by the buyer is concerned, though no
credit in regard to the transfer of title.
2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 325 (footnote omitted). See also 2 F. MECtHEM, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 1259, 1285, 1361-62, 1363 (1901); Corman,
Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. REv. 55 (1956).
Misrepresentations of solvency that induce the seller to extend credit were held at common
law to be a form of fraud and to allow the deceived seller to avoid the sale. 3 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 35, at 448. And, under the doctrine enunciated in California Conserving Co. v.
D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933), it was not necessary to demonstrate an intent not to
pay if the facts showed that, by reason of his financial situation, the buyer could not have
hoped to pay. See Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MtCH. L.
REv. 1281, 1283 (1967). The seller's power of avoidance was seen as an equitable claim,
subject to intervening rights obtained by good faith purchasers from the defrauding
buyer. See, e.g., Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573, 10 N.W. 900 (1881). The
buyer's title position was clear: he obtained voidable title and could pass indefeasible title.
The seller's power of avoidance was not put in terms of title at all. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 35, at 503.
61. L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 160 (2d ed. 1959). The common law his-
tory is nowhere codified in the Uniform Sales Act.
62. See, e.g., French v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 A. 45 (1907). For a discussion of the
commercial limitations routinely imposed on enforcement of the cash seller's right to
retake, see 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 337-42; Gilmore, supra note 60, at 1060-62.
Williston argued vigorously but unsuccessfully that acceptance of a check that turned out
to be uncollectable was a waiver of a cash sale because it amounted to acquiescence, albeit
induced by fraud, in the buyer's possession and title. See 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 35,
at 342-45. See also Note, The "Cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and
Policy Anomaly, 62 YALE L.J. 101 (1952).
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special status of cash seller.03 The sale induced by fraud was a transac-
tion in which the buyer obtained possession and some form of voidable
title by misrepresenting his intention to pay or his capacity to do so.
The materiality of this misrepresentation as an inducement to a credit
sale established the defrauded seller's right to rescind and to retake the
contract goods. Doubts about the precise characterization of the de-
frauding buyer's title led to differences in the treatment of various
takers under the buyer 65 but did not otherwise impair the seller's right
to reclaim his goods if he acted within a reasonable time after receiving
notice of the fraud. The theoretical difference between these two sales
on special condition was a difference of title: in the former the buyer
had none, in the latter he had some. This difference was more signif-
icant for subsequent purchasers and lien creditors than for the buyer
himself. In direct confrontations between seller and buyer, the same
basic principles counseled equitable enforcement of the seller's clearly
exceptional claims. Equitable enforcement, by circumscribing the use
of the disappointed seller's claim to retake, perhaps served as well as a
safety valve. In contrast to the contract expressly denominated a condi-
tional sale, these transactions were never considered to confer liens",
and therefore escaped the pre-Code regulation of transactions charac-
terized as invidious secret liens.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals explicitly with both
cash sales and fraudulent sales. Despite the Code's virtual abandonment
of title, the two transactions are at least nominally described separately.
Sections 2-507O7 and 2-51168 are the starting points for investigating the
63. See Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 269 Minn. 127, 133-36, 130
N.W.2d 69, 73-75 (1964); L. VOLD, supra note 61, at 175. Entrusting led to estoppel; typi-
cally the litigation involved confrontations with purchasers from the buyer, rather than
with the buyer himself.
64. Because tile seller's power to reclaim was tied to fraud, which implies intentional
misconduct by the buyer, it was unclear at common law how to characterize the transac-
tion of sale induced by ovcr-optimism about financial prospects, rather than by duplicity.
See, e.g., California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933); Manly v. Ohio
Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928).
65. The equities of various takers under the buyer are discussed in L. Vot, supra
note 61, at 402-04.
66. See, e.g., Southern Lumber Co. v. Colvin, 104 Ark. 130, 148 S.W. 496 (1912); Greater
Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 SAV.2d 17 (Ky. 1965).
67. Section 2-507 provides:
Effect of Seller's Tender; Delivery on Condilion
(1) Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept the goods and,
unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them. Tender entitles the seller to
acceptance of the goods and to payment according to the contract.
(2) Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or
documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is condi-
tional upon his making the payment due.
68. Section 2-511 adds presumptions for payment by check:
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cash sale doctrine, while section 2-70269 is the starting point for in-
vestigating the fraudulent sale doctrine. Between the immediate parties,
section 2-507(2) provides that the cash buyer's "right as against the
seller to retain or dispose of [goods or documents of title] is conditional
upon his making the payment due," without spelling out the remedies
available to the seller, while section 2-702(2) gives the defrauded seller
a right to reclaim goods received on credit if a demand is "made within
ten days after the receipt" of the goods, without spelling out the condi-
tional nature of the buyer's tenure. Comment 3 to section 2-507 sug-
gests a link between the two sections by opining that "[t]he provision
of this Article for a ten day limit within which the seller may reclaim
goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is also applicable here,"
where the transaction is a cash sale.7 0 This comment, carried forward
from earlier drafts of Article 2 in which section 2-702 required rec-
lamation and not just demand within ten days,7 ' clearly points to
Tender of Payment by Buyer; Payment by Check
(1) Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condition to the seller's duty to
tender and complete any delivery.
(2) Tender of payment is sufficient when made by any means or in any manner
current in the ordinary course of business unless the seller demands payment in legal
tender and gives any extension of time reasonably necessary to procure it.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act on the effect of an instrument on an
obligation (Section 3-802), payment by check is conditional and is defeated as be-
tween the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment.
69. Section 2-702 provides:
Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency.
(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery
except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the
contract, and stop delivery under this Article (Section 2-705).
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods
on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to
pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section
2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to
them.
70. Comment 3 in its entirety provides:
Subsection (2) deals with the effect of a conditional delivery by the seller and in
such a situation makes the buyer's "right as against the seller" conditional upon
payment. These words are used as words of limitation to conform with the policy set
forth in the bona fide purchase sections of this Article. Should the seller after making
such a conditional delivery fail to follow up his rights, the condition is waived. The
provision of this Article for a ten day limit within which the seller may reclaim goods
delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is also applicable here.
Section 2-507, Comment 3.
71. In the 1952 Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-702 read:
Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency
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section 2-702(2). Indeed, there is no other ten-day period in the text of
Article 2 to which the comment could refer. Although reliance on
comment to supply links missing from the text is suspect, in this case
both good sense and the similarity in vulnerability to third-party claim-
ants under section 2-40372 suggest that, remedially, cash sales and
fraudulent sales should be treated alike. Within ten days and without
any other formalities, sellers on special condition can by demand com-
mence the retaking of contract goods from their buyers.
73
If the cash sale or the fraudulent sale creates a security interest
"arising solely under" Article 2, however, the authority to reclaim
under Article 2 may be undermined by Article 9. If section 9-11374
applies in full force once the buyer is in possession, then his possession
is irreversible, because the seller's security interest is invalid without
(I) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may
(a) refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore
delivered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (Section
2-705); and
(b) subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith pur-
chaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403), and within ten
days after receipt, reclaim any goods received by the buyer on credit, but
if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not
apply.
(2) Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them.
(Emphasis added.)
72. The provisions of § 2-403(1) protect good faith purchasers from sellers who have
voidable title or who are in possession pursuant to a cash sale or to a transfer procured
through fraud:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the ex-
tent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under
a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
73. The 10-day limitation is a convenient solution, but is not universally available.
Under § 2-702, this period is extended indefinitely if the seller received a written mis-
representation of solvency within three months before delivery. There is no hint in the
text or comments of Article 2 about the relevance of such a misrepresentation in a cash
sale.
74. Section 9-113 provides:
Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable;
and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).
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a written security agreement and is subject to Article 9 rules on default
and liquidation of contract goods now characterized as collateral.
Why should an interest that is never characterized by Article 2 as
creating a "security interest" fall into the snares of section 9-113? The
definition of a security interest in Article 1 is expansive. It encompasses
any "interest in personal property . . . which secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation," without regard to consensual designation
or distinguishing features of form75 As noted earlier, the common law
seller's lien and right of stoppage in transit, neither of which is labeled
a "security interest" in Article 2, do fall within section 9-113.70 The
conditional sale, although denominated a security interest in section
2-401, is a normal Article 9 security interest rather than one "arising
solely under" Article 2. 77 Although the reference to a security interest
in section 2-505(1), concerning documentary reservations, and in section
2-711(3), concerning buyers' possessory liens, happens to fit both Article
2 and Article 9, this identity of language is surely fortuitous. To the
extent that reclamation rights are analogous to seller's liens, the fact
that Article 2 does not characterize them as "security interests" cannot
insulate them from section 9-113. The drafting pattern of Article 2
emphasizes the consequences rather than the labeling of commercial
relationships. ABC cannot be spared the travails of Article 9 simply
because sections 2-507 and 2-702 speak to rights rather than to security
interests.
Justice Braucher" offers two other reasons for differentiating rec-
lamation rights from security interests:
75. Section 1-201 (37) defines security interest:
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by a
seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is
limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest". The term also includes any
interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9. The
special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of such goods to a
contract for sale under Section 2-401 is not a "security interest", but a buyer may also
acquire a "security interest" by complying with Article 9. Unless a lease or consign-
ment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a "security interest"
but a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (Sec-
tion 2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of
each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make
the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with
the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner
of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does
make the lease one intended for security.
76. See pp. 920-21 & notes 57-59 supra.
77. See note 56 supra.
78. Mr. Justice Braucher, as Professor Braucher of the Harvard Law School, was one
of the two Coordinators for revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code for its 1962
Official Text. He has been chairman of seseral committees to consider Article 2, both
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First, a right to rescind is a right to undo the transaction-to re-
claim the goods as a substitute for the price-not a right to "secure"
payment of the price as required by the definition of "security in-
terest"; under section 2-702(3), successful reclamation "excludes
all other remedies." Second, any such security interest is not the
result of a transaction "intended to create a security interest" and is
not "created by contract" within the meaning of section 9-102,
which defines the scope of Article Nine on secured transactions. 9
The second suggestion seems plainly wrong: if a security interest arises
"solely" under Article 2, by definition it is not the result of a transac-
tion "intended to create a security interest," nor is it "created by con-
tract." Section 9-11380 is an alternate route into Article 9, which by-
before 1962 and in connection with the work of the Permanent Editorial Board since then.
The Permanent Editorial Board was urged, as early as 1962, to consider amendment of
§ 2-702(3) to delete its reference to "lien creditor." Professor Braucher was chairman of the
subcommittee that persuaded the Permanent Editorial Board in 1966 to recommend
amendment of § 2-702. See REiPoRr No. 3 OF HE PERMANRENr EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMM.IERCIAL CODE ix, 3-4 (1967).
79. Braucher, supra note 60, at 1290 (footnote omitted). These reasons have become the
accepted wisdom, usually with no further discussion or reference. See, e.g., United States
v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1974); Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v.
Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re Mel Goode Shoes, Inc.), 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir.
1968); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 176, 519 P.2d
354, 359-60 (1974) (en banc); Esans Prod. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978
(1966); Ranchers & Farmers Lihestock Auction Co. -. First St. Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the
Code, 30 Bus. LAw. 833, 844 (1975); Note, Selected Priority Problems in Secured Financing
Under the Uniforn Commercial Code, 68 YALE L.J. 751, 757-58 (1959). A recent important
case concluded, however, that a putative reclaiming seller did have an unperfected security
interest, but one achieved tinder § 2-401(1). Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526
F.2d 1238, 1246-47 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). Although Judge
Godbold in Samuels rejected the argument that security interests must be "consensually"
created, lie appeared unaware of the possibility that the reclamation right itself would be
a security interest. But see i re Hardin, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 857, 862 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (bank-
ruptcy referee), aff'd sub nora. Shapiro %. Union Bank & Sav. Co. (In re Hardin), 458 F.2d
938 (1972); Peters, supra note 8, at 220; Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of
UCC Section 2-702(3): Aiother View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an
Insolvent, 14 NV. RLs. L. REV. 93, 102-04 (1962).
It is worth noting that Justice Braucher's reasons were proposed as two (out of three)
suggestions for atoiding what he thought would otherwise be a problem with the applica-
tion of § 9-203. See Braucher, supra note 60, at 1290. Apart from that perceived problem-
which, lie also recognized, could be handled by treating the reclamation right as a security
interest exempted by § 9-113 front the filing requirements of Article 9-there is no in-
dication that Justice Braucher thought that ie was passing down undisputed wisdom.
80. Section 9-113 provides:
Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales
A security interest arising solely tinder the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the proxisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable;
and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured part), on default by the debtor are goXerned by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).
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passes the requirements of section 9-102.s1 By necessary implication,
section 9-102 is superseded whenever section 9-113 applies.
The proposition that a right to rescind cannot be a security interest
is more plausible, but it, too, is ultimately unpersuasive. It is not in-
consistent with the idea of a security interest, as section 9-505 2
recognizes, that one remedy for a secured party may be the return and
retertion of secured property.83 Moreover, as section 9-113(c) expressly
81. Section 9-102 provides:
Policy and Subject Matter of Article
(I) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this
Article applies
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents,
instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract including pledge,
assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust,
conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or
consignment intended as security. This Article does not apply to statutory liens except
as provided in Section 9-310.
(3) The application of this Article to a security interest in a secured obligation is
not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest
to which this Article does not apply.
Nothing in the definition of a security interest in § 1-201(37) requires a security interest
to be consensual in origin. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238,
1247 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
82. Section 9-505 describes the circumstances under which, after default, a secured party
may retain secured collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligation. It provides:
Compulsory Disposition of Collateral; Acceptance of the Collateral as Discharge of
Obligation
(1) If the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price in the case of a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods or sixty per cent of the loan in the case of
another security interest in consumer goods, and has not signed after default a state-
ment renouncing or modifying his rights under this Part a secured party who has
taken possession of collateral must dispose of it under Section 9-504 and if he fails to
do so within ninety days after he takes possession the debtor at his option may recover
in conversion or tinder Section 9-507(1) on secured party's liability.
(2) In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collateral a secured
party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he
has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this
subsection. In the case of consumer goods no other notice need be given. In other cases
notice shall be sent to any other secured party from whom the secured party has
received (before sending his notice to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation
of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. If the secured
party receives objection in writing from a person entitled to receie notification
within twenty-one days after the notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of
the collateral tinder Section 9-504. In the absence of such written objection the secured
party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.
83. See, e.g., Carnation l'lastic Mfg. Co. v. Giltex, Inc. (In re Giltex, Inc.), 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 887, 890 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Hardin, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 857, 862 (E.D. Wis. 1971)
(bankruptcy referee), af'd sub norn. Shapiro v. Union Bank & Say. Co. (In re Hardin),
458 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[tjhus a seller on credit is given the same rights that a
secured creditor would halie, namely, the right to repossess the goods"); Shanker, supra
note 79, at 102-06.
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acknowledges, the rights upon default preserved by Article 2 differ
from the constellation of rights existing in Article 9. In the transactions
to which section 9-113 applies, where the seller's right is to withhold
delivery or to stop goods in transit or to retain control through docu-
ments, the seller's remedy is to retain or to retrieve the contract gQods.
It is true that in all of these cases the seller's remedy of retention is not
doctrinally, although it may be practically, his exclusive remedy. Yet
in every respect other than exclusivity, the seller's right to reclaim
under a cash sale or a fraudulent sale closely resembles the interests that
are otherwise characterized as security interests "arising solely" under
Article 2 and are incorporated in Article 9 through section 9-113. And
whatever may be obscure about section 9-113, it does manifest an in-
tention to cover at least some transactions in which some buyers
temporarily receive possession, of which they may then be divested.
The critical language in section 9-113 is contained in the statement
that there may be security interests arising solely under Article 2 in
which the debtor "does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession
of the goods."8 4 Under either alternative, the hybrid security interest
is valid without the normal security agreement and is perfected without
a financing statement. If, on the other hand, the debtor obtains un-
fettered possession, the normal Article 9 requirements for validation
and perfection govern even under section 9-113. The seller reclaiming
under sections 2-507 or 2-702 appears to be a prime candidate to assert
a claim that the buyer-debtor did not "lawfully obtain possession"; in-
deed, no other claim founded in Article 2 seems to come close. As
Justice Braucher pointed out, a right of reclamation routinely arises as
a result of behavior that is impliedly fraudulent, even though intent to
deceive is not an express prerequisite of the seller's cause of action.sa
84. This language in the alternative is derived from § 56 of the Uniform Sales Act,
which described the circumstances under which an unpaid seller's lien was lost. Section
56 provided:
When lien is lost.-(l) The unpaid seller of goods loses his lien thereon-
(a) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose of
transmission to the buyer without reserving the property in the goods or the right
to the possession thereof;
(b) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods;
(c) By waiver thereof.
(2) The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien thereon, does not lose his lien by
reason only that he has obtained judgment or decree for the price of the goods.
This history illuminates the otherwise puzzling alternative phraseology in § 9-113, which
suggests similar treatment for both nonpossession and unlawful possession. It would be
possible to read the phrase "does not have ... possession" in § 9-113 to throw any hybrid
transaction entirely into Article 9 as soon as possession, however procured, had passed to
the buyer. But such a reading would leave the rest of the phrase, "or does not lawfully
obtain possession," without operative meaning, and should therefore be avoided.
85. Braucher, supra note 60, at 1282-84, 1290. See also § 2-702, Comment 2; King, Rec-
lamation Petition Granted: In Defense of the Defrauded Seller, REF. L.J., July 1970, at
929
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"Unlawful" possession must refer principally to fraudulent conduct by
the Family Furnitures of this world, since outright theft entitles ABC
to a claim in conversion rather than to a security interest.
In sum, the seller reclaiming under the special conditions of a cash
sale or a fraudulent sale has the right to reclaim only under the cir-
cumstances dictated by Article 2. Compliance with the Article 2 re-
quirements, principally its ten-day demand period, allows ABC to re-
take the contract sofas from Family Furniture. ABC has a section 9-113
security interest but is excused, by section 9-113 itself, from compliance
with Article 9 validation requirements. Section 9-113 may introduce
priority complications for ABC, but it does not alter proprietary rights
between ABC and Family Furniture. 6
81, 82. Once the cash seller is otherwise assimilated to the position of a credit seller in a sale
induced by fraud, there is no reason why the cash seller should not also be able to rely on
this presumption of fraud.
86. The reclamation right that is provided by §§ 2-507 and 2-702 is a right that runs
textually only to "the goods." However, if that right is a security interest arising solely
under Article 2, so that Article 9 is made applicable (apart from default rules) by § 9-113,
then it is plausible to believe that the reclamation right "continues in any identifiable
proceeds," § 9-306(2), until either the termination of the reclamation right under Article 2
or the expiration of "ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor," § 9-306(3),
whichever occurs first. Section 9-306(2) and (3) provide:
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the dis-
position was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise,
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the
debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest if
the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected
security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by
the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are
collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office
or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the proceeds
are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the financing
statement indicates the types of property constituting the proceeds; or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are
identifiable cash proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of the
ten day period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest in proceeds can be perfected
only by the methods or under the circumstances permitted in this Article for original
collateral of the same type.
In In re Samuels & Co., in which it appeared that the cattle had "long since been
butchered and processed and sold through the normal course of business"--presumably
to buyers in the ordinary course of business-the issue concerned the priority of interest in
proceeds between the reclaiming cattle farmers and C.I.T. Corporation. Stowers v. Mahon
(In re Samuels & Co.), 510 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). The court did not address the question whether
the reclamation right automatically attached itself, via Article 9, to the proceeds of resale.
Here, again, where the Code does not speak to a situation in which Articles 2 and 9 appear
to point in different directions, resort to the underlying policies would suggest that, absent
unusual circumstances, the reclamation right should, like other perfected security in-
terests, shift to proceeds upon resale.
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D. ABC Reacquires Goods from Family Furniture
In all other cases in which the seller reacquires goods from a buyer at
some time lawfully in possession, the seller's rights are more prob-
lematic. At common law, the seller's lien was sometimes said to be
revived by repossession, although it was unclear whether revival im-
plied a new lien or renewal of an old lien.8 7 Whatever the rationale, in
the language of a leading case, "[t]his rule probably serves commercial
convenience, and we accept it.""$
Consideration of the revival of a seller's lien has usually arisen in the
context of reacquisition triggered by the buyer's default. The buyer
may refuse to pay out of obduracy (or a "temporary cash bind"), or
he may wrongfully claim that nonconformity in the tendered goods
excuses his obligation to pay. But reacquisition may also occur because
of the seller's default if the buyer rightfully rejects the goods or revokes
his acceptance, or because of a consensual modification totally apart
from, or in settlement of, a dispute about the contract of sale.
Article 2 of the Code, which says nothing directly about seller's liens,
predictably says little about the inferences to be drawn from the seller's
repossession. Although Article 2 discourages rejection"9 and may there-
by diminish the likelihood that goods will be reacquired by the seller,
it does not preclude rejection entirely. According to section 2-401(4),
"[a] rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the
goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance
revests title to the goods in the seller." 90 And section 2-602(3) adds that
87. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 107-08.
88. Jones v. LeMay-Lieb Corp., 301 Mass. 133, 135, 16 N.E.2d 634, 635 (1938).
89. See Peters, supra note 8, at 206-16.
90. Section 2-401 provides, in its entirety:
Passing of Title; Reservation for Security; Limited Application of This Section
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies
of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title
to the goods except where the provision refers to such title. Insofar as situations are
not covered by the other provisions of this Article and matters concerning title be-
come material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identification
to the contract (Section 2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer ac-
quires by their identification a special property as limited by this Act. Any retention
or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the
buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest. Subject to these
provisions and to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9), title
to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any nianner and on any conditions
explicitly agreed on by the parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a
document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place; and in particular and
despite any reservation of a security interest by the bill of lading
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the buyer
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"[t]he seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are
governed by the provisions of this Article on Seller's remedies in gen-
eral (Section 2-703)." 91 Section 2-703, in turn, permits an aggrieved
seller to "resell and recover damages" and to "cancel." 92 Between the
but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the
buyer at the time and place of shipment; but
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender there.
(3) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where delivery is to be made without moving
the goods,
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of title, title passes at the time when and
the place where he delivers such documents; or
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already identified and no docu-
ments are to be delivered, title passes at the time and place of contracting.
(4) A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the goods, whether
or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance revests title to the goods in
the seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law and is not a "sale".
91. Section 2-602(3) is part of a section dealing generally with rightful rejection. That
section provides, in its entirety:
Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or
tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two following sections on rejected goods (Sec-
tions 2-603 and 2-604),
(a) after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with respect to any
commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller; and
(b) if the buyer has before rejection taken physical possession of goods in which
he does not have a security interest under the provisions of this Article (sub-
section (3) of Section 2-711), he is under a duty after rejection to hold them
with reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit
the seller to remove them; but
(c) the buyer has no further obligations with regard to goods rightfully rejected.
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are governed by the
provisions of this Article on Seller's remedies in general (Section 2-703).
This statement of the seller's rights is reinforced by a similar provision in § 2-709(3),
dealing with the seller's action for the price, which provides yet another indication of the
reversion of the seller's rights over sold goods. Section 2-709 provides:
Action for the Price
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover,
together with any incidental damages under the next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a com-
mercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable
effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that such effort will be unavailing.
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the buyer any goods which
have been identified to the contract and are still in his control except that if resale
becomes possible he may resell them at any time prior to the collection of the judg-
ment. The net proceeds of any such resale must be credited to the buyer and payment
of the judgment entitles him to any goods not resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods or
has failed to make a payment due or has repudiated (Section 2-610), a seller who is
held not entitled to the price under this section shall nevertheless be awarded damages
for non-acceptance under the preceding section.
92. Section 2-703 provides:
Seller's Remedies in General
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make
a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part or the whole,
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immediate parties, these sections serve to give the seller the same rights
to which he would have been entitled at common law as a revived
lienor.03
This analysis of the seller's rights under Article 2 and the analogy to
lien status raise Article 9 questions. How, if at all, does a reacquiring
seller fit into section 9-113?94 Does a reacquiring seller have a security
interest under any circumstances?
Once a seller has managed to reacquire contract goods for any
legitimate reason, he is likely to view inquiries into his security status
as surprising and gratuitous. The buyer's possessory interlude is now,
after all, totally superseded by the seller's concededly authorized re-
acquisition. The logic of reacquisition of title and possession suggests
that the repossessing seller is an owner rather than a secured party. Yet
under section 9-113 there is no metaphysical inconsistency between
ownership and possession on the one hand and security status on the
other. If the seller's justifiable withholding of delivery furnishes the
paradigm for Article 9 supervision, as an Article 9 security interest, of
a security interest "arising solely under the Article on Sales," the
seller's reacquisition can hardly escape similar characterization.
The language of section 9-113 arguably accommodates the vicissi-
tudes of the reacquiring seller. It provides that Article 9 rules on
validation, perfection, and default do not apply "so long as the debtor
then with respect to any goods directly affected and, if the breach is of the whole
contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole undelivered balance, the
aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided (Section 2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified to the
contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Section 2-706);
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708) or in a proper case the
price (Section 2-709);
(f) cancel.
93. The common law cases seem to have revolved principally around the seller's right
to resell and to measure damages by losses, if any, under the resale. This issue was com-
plicated by the reliance of the common law on title to determine monetary claims after
breach. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LW OF ADMIRALrY 102-08 (2d ed. 1975). The
cases do not seem to have arisen in contexts involving the rights of third parties.
94. Section 9-113 provides:
Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable;
and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).
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does not have ... possession." If "so long as" implies that the debtor's
possession is reversible, then, upon reacquisition, the seller's Article 2
rights are not seriously compromised. Although such a seller may have
to take into account the interests of other parties that arose while the
buyer was in possession," his reacquisition is still to be distinguished
from the retaking associated with ordinary Article 9 security interests.'3
It is of course by no means clear that section 9-113 was drafted to
accommodate the reacquiring seller rather than to hedge uncertainties
about delivery and tender. The ambiguous reach of "so long as" may
well be influenced by the circumstances of the reacquisition. Retaking
as a resolution of disagTeement about the quality or suitability of
ABC's sofas may well trigger different responses than repossession con-
sequent to the "mere" failure of Family Furniture to pay, even if, in
this latter case, repossession is consensual rather than forcible. Inquiry
into attendant circumstances is certainly consistent with the methodol-
ogy of Article 2, even if it proves disconcerting to the Article 2 seller.
Yet such inquiry should avoid imposing risks that are genuinely un-
foreseeable. Between ABC and Family Furniture, reacquisition that is
authorized by Article 2 should foreclose fishing expeditions into the
status of the seller's interest under Article 9. At least as to the validity
of proprietary claims between the immediate parties, if not as to the
claims of third parties, "so long as" in section 9-113 should be read to
protect the reasonable expectations of the reacquiring seller.
II. Perfection of the Unpaid Seller's Proprietary Claim to Sold Goods
The proprietary claims of the unpaid seller against his buyer are
reasonably well established by both Article 2 and Article 9 of the Code.
The competing claims of lien creditors of the buyer are, like all third-
party claims, more obscure. There is little overall guidance in Article
2 about the rights of creditors except in the few transactions that the
Article singles out as so fraught with fraudulent overtones that creditors
need special protection. Apart from these transactions, involving sellers
left in possession of sold goods97 and agents entrusted with consigned
95. Third-party claims will be discussed in the remainder of this article.
96. If the repossessing seller comes within the "except" clause of § 9-113, Article 9
rules about validation, perfection, and default are all waived.
97. Section 2-402 incorporates the common law principle of ostensible ownership, which
allows creditors of a seller to levy on sold goods if the seller's retention of possession is or
can be deemed fraudulent. Section 2-402 provides:
Rights of Seller's Creditors Against Sold Goods
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of unsecured creditors of
the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a contract for sale are
934
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goods,98 Article 2 refers creditors to rights set out in Article 9.99 This
omission cannot be justified by an absence of foreseeable conflict be-
tween the unpaid seller and the creditors of his buyer. As one example,
subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods under this Article (Sections 2-502 and
2-716).
(2) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a
contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is
fraudulent under any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated, except
that retention of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-
seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not fraudu-
lent.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the
seller
(a) tinder the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9); or
(b) where identification to the contract or delivery is made not in current course
of trade but in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim for money,
security or the like and is made under circumstances which under any rule of
law of the state where the goods are situated would apart from this Article
constitute the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference.
98. Sections 2-326 and 9-114 deal with consignments, transactions in which an agent is
entrusted with goods for the purpose of sale. Creditors of the agent may subject those
goods to their claims if the agent appears to have the characteristics of a merchant dealing
in goods of that kind and if precautionary warnings have not been given. Section 9-114
deals with questions of priority in consigned goods; § 2-326 defines the rights of general
creditors as follows:
Sale on Approval and Sale or Return; Consignment Sales and Rights of Creditors
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be returned by the buyer even
though they conform to the contract, the transaction is
(a) a "sale on approval" if the goods are delivered primarily for use, and
(b) a "sale or return" if the goods are delivered primarily for resale.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), goods held on approval are not subject to
the claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance; goods held on sale or return are
subject to such claims while in the buyer's possession.
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains a
place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name other
than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors
of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on sale or return.
The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an agreement purports
to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment or resale or uses such
words as "on consignment" or "on memorandum". However, this subsection is not
applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the
like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known by his
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9).
(4) Any "or return" term of a contract for sale is to be treated as a separate con-,
tract for sale within the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) and as
contradicting the sale aspect of the contract within the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202).
99. The rights of third-party claimants generally in Article 2 are located in Part 4 of
that Article. Subsection (4) of § 2-403 makes a sweeping reference to several articles, in-
cluding Article 9, for the law that "govern[s]" the "rights of . lien creditors." Section
2-403 in its entirety provides:
Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods; "Entrusting"
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
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consider the case of ABC, as an unpaid seller, once goods are marked
and identified for shipment to Family Furniture. Identification gives
Family Furniture rights described by Article 2 under the rubric of
"special property," which may well be difficult to distinguish from
title.100 It is not unlikely that judicial process of some sort will enable
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the
extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under
a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of posses.
sion regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or ac-
quiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the pos-
sessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal
law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by
the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Docu-
ments of Title (Article 7).
100. Under § 2-401(1), identification is a prerequisite to the passage of title, while the
consequence of identification is normally to give the buyer "a special property as limited
by this Act." Section 2-401(1) provides:
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies
of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title
to the goods except where the provision refers to such title. Insofar as situations are
not covered by the other provisions of this Article and matters concerning title be-
come material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identification
to the contract (Section 2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer ac-
quires by their identification a special property as limited by this Act. Any retention
or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to
the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest. Subject to these
provisions and to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9),
title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions
explicitly agreed on by the parties.
Identification is defined and described in § 2-501:
Insurable Interest in Goods; Manner of Identification of Goods
(I) The buyer obtains a special property and an insurable interest in goods by
identification of existing goods as goods to which the contract refers even though the
goods so identified are non-conforming and he has an option to return or reject them.
Such identification can be made at any time and in any manner explicitly agreed to
by the parties. In the absence of explicit agreement identification occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing and
identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other than those described in
paragraph (c), when goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by
the seller as goods to which the contract refers;
(c) when the crops are planted or otherwise become growing crops or the young
are conceived if the contract is for the sale of unborn young to be born within
twelve months after contracting or for the sale of crops to be harvested
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a creditor with a judgment against Family Furniture to reach this
"special property."'' If Family Furniture is not only indebted but
also insolvent, then Family Furniture's trustee in bankruptcy will
make similar demands. In these unhappy circumstances, several courts
have chosen to look to local pre-Code law rather than to Article 9, on
the theory that Article 9 applies only to security interests created by
Article 9.102 It is fair to say that these courts have not taken section
9-113 fully into account.
0 3
In fact, the unpaid seller who is assimilated into Article 9 because he
has a security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales receives
considerable protection by the provisions of section 9-113. The rights
of a lien creditor turn, under section 9-301,104 on whether the com-
within twelve months or the next normal harvest season after contracting
whichever is longer.
(2) The seller retains an insurable interest in goods so long as title to or any security
interest in the goods remains in him and where the identification is by the seller
alone he may until default or insolvency or notification to the buyer that the identi-
fication is final substitute other goods for those identified.
(3) Nothing in this section impairs any insurable interest recognized under any other
statute or rule of law.
There is little further codification of the consequences of "special property" in Article 2.
Under § 2-502, a prepaying buyer of goods in which he has a special property may
possibly recover the identified goods from an insolvent seller. The functional dimensions
of this right are precarious at best. See Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing
Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1 (1975). Section 2-722 spells out the consequences of an insurable risk
for claims against third parties who damage identified goods. Otherwise, there is only the
definition of "security interest" in § 1-201(37), which stipulates, inter alia, that "[t]he
special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of such goods to a contract
for sale under Section 2-401 is not a 'security interest', but a buyer may also acquire a
,security interest' by compl)ing with Article 9." By contrast, the buyer who has made
payments for goods in his possession, which the buyer chooses rightfully to reject or to
revoke, has what § 2-711(3) denominates a "security interest." Comment I to § 9-113 sug-
gests that this security may be encompassed within the range of security interests "arising
solely under the Article on Sales," with the seller as debtor and the buyer as secured
creditor.
101. The Code does not anywhere purport to determine when a judicial lien attaches
or what property a judicial lienor may reach. See Note, Nonconsensual Liens Under
Article 9, 76 YALE: L.J. 1649, 1665-68 (1967). The common law rules manifest "hopeless
prolixity and diversification." Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American
Law-A Historical Inventoiy and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. RPv. 155, 155 (1957).
102. See, e.g., Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re
Mel Golde Shoes, Inc.), 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.
1960).
103. See In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977).
104. Section 9-301 provides:
Persons Who Take Priority Over Unperfected Security Interests; Rights of "Lien
Creditor"
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security interest
is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312;
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected;
(c) in the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper, a person who
is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in
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peting interest is perfected at the time the creditor levies. Under sec-
tion 9-113, the seller's hybrid security interest is perfected without the
filing of a financing statement, so long as the seller's interest is posses-
sory.1°05 Like the ordinary secured creditor who perfects his interest by
possession of pledged collateral, 10 6 the Article 2 seller has a perfected
interest, and therefore priority over lien creditors, so long as he with-
holds or regains the contract goods. ABC need not fear the wrath, or
the lien, of Family Furniture's creditors unless those creditors manage
to levy on ABC's sofas while they are in the possession of Family
Furniture or its agent.
The most difficult case is that of delivery on special condition-the
cash sale or the credit sale induced by misrepresentation of solvency. If
creditors levy or bankruptcy ensues while Family Furniture is tem-
porarily in possession, who should prevail? This question, variously
answered at common law and in successive drafts of Article 2, deserves
to be laid to rest. A majority of legislatures first enacted a version of
ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in ordinary course
of business, to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the
collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected;
(d) in the case of accounts and general intangibles, a person who is not a secured
party and who is a transferee to the extent that he gives value without knowl-
edge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
(2) If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest be-
fore or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes
priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise
between the time the security interest attaches arid the time of filing.
(3) A "lien creditor" means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property in-
volved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors
from the time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing
of the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.
(4) A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is perfected takes
subject to the security interest only to the extent that it secures advances made before
he becomes a lien creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made without knowledge of
the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.
105. A possessory security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales falls within
the exemption of § 9-113(b):
Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable;
and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).
106. With the exception of a few special security interests that enjoy automatic perfec-
tion, see §§ 9-302(1), 9-304, security interests are ordinarily perfected either by filing or
by the secured party's taking or retaining possession. Section 9-305 permits perfection
through possession for every form of collateral except accounts and general intangibles.
The only distinction between perfection by filing and perfection by possession is that
there is no relation back for perfection by possession.
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section 2-702 that specifically foreclosed reclamation by a defrauded
seller once a lien creditor had intervened. 107 When it was discovered
that this priority decision reversed well-established common law cases to
the contrary, the offending language was dropped from section 2702.8os
If legislative history means anything, it means that the drafters, newly
enlightened, intended to instruct that lien creditors should lose, or at
least that they should not prevail, absent unusual equities. Perhaps it
is difficult for courts to draw inferences from language that, like the
Cheshire cat, is no longer there.1 9
If the matter of perfection is considered from the vantage of Article
9 and section 9-113, it seems as plausible here as it was when we were
considering the validity of the seller's interest to say that the buyer-
debtor's possession is sufficiently "unlawful" so that the seller's security
interest is perfected without the filing of a financing statement.110
107. In the 1962 Official Text of the Code, § 2-702(3) read:
The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer
in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this Article
(Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect
to them.
(Emphasis added.)
108. The history of the drafting and amendment of § 2-702 is described in Braucher,
supra note 60, at 1285-88.
109. Unfortunately, in a large number of jurisdictions the original language of § 2-702,
and the reference to "lien creditor," have remained unamended. These jurisdictions have
no direct mandate to prefer the reclaiming seller over a lien creditor, but must instead
analyze what upset powers, if any, a lien creditor is entitled to assert.
Under the amended § 2-702(3), the battleground has shifted to the qtestion whether
the reclamation right of § 2-702(2) is a statutory lien, voidable under § 67c(l)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970), or a disguised, state-created priority in-
validated by § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, id. § 104. See, e.g., In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d
509 (6th Cir. 1977); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.),
524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975); In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 430 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (bankruptcy judge). Contra, Carnation Plastic Mfg. Co. v. Giltex, Inc. (In re Giltex,
Inc.), 17 U.C.C. Rep. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Good Deal Supermarkets Inc., 384 F.
Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974). For divergent views on this topic, see, e.g., Anderson, The Re-
claiming Seller Under UCC Section 2-702 vs. His Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 8 ST.
MARY's L.J. 271 (1976); Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L.
Rav. 435 (1971); Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and Defrauded Sellers-
Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67 Com. L.J.
86 (1962); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-§ 2-702: Conflict with § 67c(1)(A) of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act, 53 N.C.L. REv. 169 (1974).
110. Under § 9-113, if the debtor "does not lawfully obtain possession," then § 9-113(b)
waives the requirement of filing for perfection. Section 9-113 provides:
Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable;
and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).
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Temporary perfection without filing or possession is expressly validated
for practical commercial reasons elsewhere in Article 9.111 In fact, if the
reclaiming seller acts to repossess within ten days, his posture is func-
tionally indistinguishable from that of a purchase money secured
creditor who files a financing statement within ten days after the debtor
takes possession. 112 This analysis loses persuasiveness, however, if the
seller's reclamation is indefinitely delayed, as is permissible under sec-
tion 2-702 when the seller has relied on a written misrepresentation of
solvency," 3 or if the seller privately demands reclamation but then
does not actually reclaim. It would be consistent with pre-Code case
law on cash sales" 4 and general principles of estoppel incorporated
111. Temporary perfection without filing or possession is permitted for 21 days for a
security interest in instruments or negotiable documents under § 9-304. Similarly, a
security interest in proceeds is continuously perfected under § 9-306 for 10 days after
receipt by the debtor. Good and sufficient commercial reasons support preferment of the
secured to the lien lender under these circumstances. Short-term protection from transac-
tions induced by fraud may be equally worthy of preferment. The choice is one of policy,
on which reasonable people have been known to differ, as Justice Braucher shows, see
Braucher, supra note 60, at 1281 & n.2. In any case, a choice in favor of the reclaiming
seller would not do fundamental violence to the Article 9 scheme of perfection.
112. Under § 9-301(2), a secured party who "files with respect to a purchase money
security interest before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral . . . takes priority over the rights of . . . a lien creditor" that arose in the gap
between possession and filing. Technically, this grace period is available only to the
secured party who perfects by filing and not to one who perfects by taking possession. See
§ 9-305; 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 445-49. Still, given the special constraints that
limit the class of purchase money security interests, see § 9-107, the reclaiming seller may
be exempted from the obloquy that has befallen the equitable pledgor. Furthermore, it is
not entirely clear that Article 9 totally supersedes the doctrine of equitable lien. See, e.g.,
General Ins. Co. v. Lowry, 412 F. Supp. 12 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Warren Tool Co. v. Stephen-
son, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 NAV.2d 133 (1968).
Although repossession within 10 days is not required, action beyond the demand might
reasonably be required to be asserted promptly. See, e.g., In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (bankruptcy referee), aff'd, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
113. Section 2-702 provides:
Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency
(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery except
for cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and
stop delivery under this Article (Section 2-705).
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods
on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to
pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section
2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to
them.
The timing of the misrepresentation of solvency under subsection (2) relates to receipt of
the misinformation, rather than to demand for reclamation upon discovery of insolvency.
114. See Gilmore, supra note 60, at 1061-62 (discussing commercial limitations on cash
sale doctrine at common law).
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through section 1-103 to be less tolerant about the time within which
ABC must assert its reclamation rights when it is dealing with Family
Furniture's creditors than when it is dealing with Family Furniture
itself. At some point, acquiescence in Family Furniture's possession, no
matter how induced, could be thought to convert "unlawful" into
"lawful" possession." 5 Although ten days may be too short a time for
all purposes, courts should be willing to determine, upon examination
of the circumstances and of commercial custom and usage, how soon a
reasonably diligent seller could have alerted himself to the facts of his
buyer's financial life."" Whatever the outcome of this inquiry, it bears
noting that the flexible methodology of Article 2 is and should be a
principal resource for informing the language of section 9-113 and for
governing, wherever possible, Article 9 security interests arising solely
under Article 2.
In bankruptcy a solution in which perfection depends on case-by-
case determination of the timeliness of repossession is admittedly short
of ideal. Even if such perfection passes muster under the strong-arm
clause of section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act,"17 it may be vulnerable
as preferential under section 60.118 On the whole, appellate courts in
115. See, e.g., Bar Control v. Gifford (In re Colacci's of America, Inc.), 490 F.2d 1118
(10th Cir. 1974). Cf. In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968)
(bankruptcy referee), aff'd, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)
(something more than bare oral demand required to exercise right of reclamation).
116. The idea that a reasonable time to take action may vary with the circumstances is
consistent with other provisions in Articles I and 2 of the Code. Section 1-204 is ex-
tremely open-ended:
Time; Reasonable Time; "Seasonably"
(1) Whenever this Act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time,
any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, pur-
pose and circumstances of such action.
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is taken at or within the time agreed
or if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time.
The remedies provisions of Article 2 demonstrate similar flexibility. The buyer who is
tendered nonconforming goods has different time periods in which to act, depending on
whether or not the defect is patent and on the remedy that the buyer chooses to pursue.
See §§ 2-601, 2-602, 2-607, 2-608. The buyer's delay in notification of dissatisfaction is most
likely to be excused when the claim is limited to damages and is brought by "a retail
consumer." See § 2-607, Comment 4.
117. The case law under § 70(c) has, at least since Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank,
364 U.S. 603 (1961), resisted speculation that elevates the bankruptcy trustee over other
creditors. For a recent example, see In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977).
118. Extensive revision of the Bankruptcy Act has been pending in Congress for several
years. The final shape and destiny of the various proposals for reform are as yet unclear.
Each of the various proposals has suggested major substantive alterations of the powers
of the trustee in bankruptcy to upset pre-bankruptcy transfers of the debtor's property,
powers currently contained in Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 70, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107, 110 (1970).
See HousE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW%' REVISION, H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 177-80 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 REPORT]; I REPORT OF THE COIIMISSION ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
200-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 REPORT]. H.R. 8200, the bill passed by the House
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recent years have proven remarkably receptive to arguments that pro-
tect open-ended commercial transactions against attack in bank-
ruptcy.119 It should be added that our analysis, which reads expansively
the category of security interests arising solely under Article 2, should
not increase their vulnerability to the statutory lien provision of the
Bankruptcy Act, section 67, which invalidates liens arising "solely by
force of statute." Relationships arising under Article 2 are statutory in
the sense that a codification is an act of a state legislature. But the
relationships thus codified have their origins in common law com-
mercial principles that depend on contract, not on statute. As the Sixth
Circuit recently observed in rejecting the application of section 67 to
defeat the reclamation right of a defrauded seller, "[t]he Code is far
more than a spurious state law created by special interests for their own
special protection.' ' 120 None of the Code's rules for perfection of seller's
liens is designed to operate specially in bankruptcy. Only when they
operate to protect liens that are essentially secret over prolonged periods
should they be read narrowly.
III. Enforcement of the Unpaid Seller's Proprietary Claim to Sold
Goods
The unpaid seller who has succeeded in retaining, reclaiming, or
reacquiring contract goods has come a long way toward effective pro-
tection of his proprietary claim. The fact of his possession validates and
perfects his claim to the goods. The question now to be considered is
in early 1978, contains, in addition to sections giving the trustee upset powers (§§ 544, 547,
and 548), another section, § 546, that limits the trustee's power to avoid. H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H11746 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977). In H.R. 8200, § 546(b)
would protect from the trustee in bankruptcy the right of a seller of goods to reclaim sold
goods from an insolvent buyer who received goods on credit, so long as such a seller
demanded reclamation within 10 days of the debtor's receipt of the goods. If enacted,
§ 546(b) would solve admirably the problem of § 2-702(3) of the U.C.C.; it would not
directly protect the cash seller's right to reclaim under § 2-507(2).
119. It was widely feared that the provisions of Article 9 that protect security interests
covering after-acquired property and future advances, often referred to as floating liens,
would be deemed to be preferences for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. See 2 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 29, at 1309-25. In fact, the case law has accepted the Code plan so
uncritically, see, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969), that the various
proposed new Bankruptcy Acts would revise the law of preference to achieve an in-
termediate position that would look to the question whether there had been an improve-
ment of the creditor's position at the expense of the debtor's estate. 1977 REPORT, supra
note 118; 1 1973 REPORT, supra note 118, at 201-11. The Reports incorporate the criticism
of DuBay v. Williams by the Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code, chaired by Professor Grant Gilmnore. 1977 REPORT, supra note
118, at 177-79; 1 1973 REPORT, supra note 118, at 206-10.
120. In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Smith, Title and
Right to Possession Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 B.C. INDUS. & Coa,. L. Rtv.
39, 53-56 (1968).
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whether, as an Article 2 seller or an Article 9 secured party, ABC in
possession may do what it pleases with the contract goods or must ac-
count for their proceeds to Family Furniture or takers under Family
Furniture. To what extent does Family Furniture's default (or its con-
sent to ABC's possession or retaking) allow ABC to decide whether to
retain or to resell the contract sofas? Is ABC or Family Furniture
entitled to profit if ABC should happen upon a resale buyer who is
willing to pay more for the sofas than the ABC-Family Furniture con-
tract price?
On first reading, the rights of an unpaid seller and a secured creditor
after default appear remarkably similar. The provisions on resale under
section 2-706121 and disposition under section 9-504122 include require-
121. Section 2-706 provides:
Seller's Resale Including Contract for Resale
(1) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's remedies, the seller may
resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof. Where the resale is
made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover
the difference between the resale price and the contract price together with any
incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-701), but
less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) or unless otherwise agreed resale
may be at public or private sale including sale by way of one or more contracts to sell
or of identification to an existing contract of the seller. Sale may be as a unit or in
parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the sale in-
cluding the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
The resale must be reasonably identified as referring to the broken contract, but it is
not necessary that the goods be in existence or that any or all of them have been
identified to the contract before the breach.
(3) Where the resale is at private sale the seller must give the buyer reasonable
notification of his intention to resell.
(4) Where the resale is at public sale
(a) only identified goods can be sold except where there is a recognized market
for a public sale of futures in goods of the kind; and
(b) it must be made at a usual place or market for public sale if one is reason-
ably available and except in the case of goods which are perishable or threaten
to decline in value speedily the seller must give the buyer reasonable notice
of the time and place of the resale; and
(c) if the goods are not to be within the view of those attending the sale the
notification of sale must state the place where the goods are located and
provide for their reasonable inspection by prospective bidders; and
(d) the seller may buy.
(5) A purchaser who buys in good faith at a resale takes the goods free of any rights
of the original buyer even though the seller fails to comply with one or more of the
requirements of this section.
(6) The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on any resale.
A person in the position of a seller (Section 2-707) or a buyer who has rightfully re-
jected or justifiably revoked acceptance must account for any excess over the amount
of his security interest, as hereinafter defined (subsection (3) of Section 2-711).
122. Section 9-504 provides:
Secured Party's Right to Dispose of Collateral After Default; Effect of Disposition
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all
of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable prep-
aration or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the Article on Sales (Article 2).
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ments of notice and commercial reasonableness and protect good faith
purchasers at a liquidation sale. But closer examination discloses that
the Article 2 seller enjoys degrees of freedom that the Article 9 secured
party does not share. After default, the Article 2 seller need not permit
The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease,
selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement
and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses
incurred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which
the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in
the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is received before
distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party,
the holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish reason-
able proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need not
comply with his demand.
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account
to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for
any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel
paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the
security agreement so provides.
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be
made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or
in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the dis-
position including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially
reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or
is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the
time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the
secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing
or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other
notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other secured
party from whom the secured party has received (before sending his notification to
the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a
claim of an interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale
and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a
type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy
at private sale.
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition
transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the
security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate
thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though the
secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this Part or of any judicial
proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects
in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other
bidders or the person conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, re-
purchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the
secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the
secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral
under this Article.
The effect of the 1972 amendment is to make it less burdensome for the senior secured
lender to deal with junior secured lenders, because notification to them is now required
only if they have given the senior secured lender written notice of a claim of interest in
the collateral.
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redemption, 123 need not resell, 2 4 need not account for resale profits.1 25
Under Article 2, the seller, proudly revested with title,126 has full
authority to dispose of his goods. The Article 9 secured party, by con-
trast, is a kind of trustee for the benefit of those who have a stake in
the secured collateral, the debtor and junior secured parties. Reposses-
sion does not definitively terminate the secured transaction and does
not extinguish other secured claims, junior or senior. The debtor and
junior secured parties are entitled to notification of the repossessing
secured party's plans for the secured collateral, 2 7 to participation in
decisions about the collateral,12 and to an accounting of tie proceeds
generated by the sale of the collateral. 2 0 In either article, ABC is
entitled first to be made whole and then to have the first say on how
to proceed. But the road to correct liquidation under Article 9 is filled
with potholes.
1 a
It is possible to argue that, because they better protect a wide range
of important commercial interests, Article 9 principles should always
apply whenever lien creditors or junior secured parties have a stake in
liquidation after default. The permissive rules of Article 2, which seem
to provide the seller many options and only limited constraints, should
perhaps be restricted, as are other Article 2 rules,13 ' to situations in
123. Although upon default sellers have a general right to cure, see § 2-508, buyers
do not. Section 2-511(2) allows a buyer who tenders payment by check additional time to
tender cash when the seller so insists; no other provision in Article 2 alters the time or
manner of the buyer's contract performance. Even the sections that govern anticipatory
repudiation, which encourage retraction of repudiation, do not require the aggrieved
seller to permit reinstatement of the contract. See §§ 2-610, 2-611, and especially 2-610(b).
These provisions are discussed in Peters, supra note 8, at 263-67.
124. The seller who does not resell is entitled to damages for nonacceptance measured
by the difference between the market and contract prices at the time and place for
tender. See § 2-708(l). The sections of Part 7 of Article 2, and their drafting history,
strongly suggest that the seller can elect this measurement of damages whether or not he
actually resells the contract goods. See Peters, supra note 8, at 260-61. Contra, J. WIrTE
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF 'IHE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 223-24 (1972).
125. See § 2-706(6). If profits result not from changes in the market, but rather from
retention of the buyer's down payment, § 2-718(2) and (3) may require accounting for
these moneys. The relationship of § 2-718(2) and (3) to resale by a repossessing seller,
rather than by a withholding seller, is unclear.
126. See § 2.401(4).
127. See § 9-504(3).
128. See §§ 9-505(2) (junior lienor may require resale of collateral), 9-506 (junior lienor
may redeem collateral).
129. See § 9-504(l)(c).
130. A secured party who fails to comply with the default rules of Article 9 is liable
in damages, under § 9-507(1), to "the debtor or any person entitled to notification or
whose security interest has been made known to the secured party" for "any loss caused
by a failure to comply." In addition, noncompliance jeopardizes the secured party's claim
to a deficiency under § 9-504(2).
131. See, e.g., § 2-507(2) (describing right of cash sale buyer to retain goods as "his
right as against the seller" (emphasis added)). In its entirety, § 2-507(2) provides:
Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or
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which there are no interests other than those of the immediate buyer
and seller. There is support for this argument in section 2-403, which,
as one of a variety of provisions subordinating immediate-party claims
to third-party intervenors, refers to Article 9 as the source of "rights"
for lien creditors and other purchasers.132 The provisions of Article 9
on repossession and liquidation do afford affirmative rights to junior
lienors who are purchasers'1 in the nomenclature of the Code, al-
though lien creditors must look to local process to enforce their
rights. 134 On the other hand, to the extent that Article 9 is more
solicitous of Family Furniture as a debtor than is Article 2 of Family
Furniture as a buyer, it is somewhat odd to allow access to these pro-
visions to turn on the happenstance of third-party claims under Family
Furniture. Furthermore, Article 9 itself, in section 9-113 on security
interests arising under the Article on Sales, relegates possessory hybrid
security interests to Article 2 rules on default. Thus section 2-403(4)
points to Article 9, and section 9-113(c) points to Article 2.
A concrete example may illuminate the dilemma that these sections
create. Assume that Family Furniture is indebted to a lender with a
documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is condi-
tional upon his making the payment due.
The third-party implications of the cash sale are dealt with in § 2-403(1):
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the ex-
tent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under
a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
132. Section 2-403(4) provides:
The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the
Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Docu-
ments of Title (Article 7).
133. The definition of "purchaser" in § 1-201(33) informatively provides:
"Purchaser" means a person who takes by purchase.
"Purchase" in § 1-201(32) has affirmative content:
"Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortagage, pledge, lien,
issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in prop-
erty.
Junior lienors who notify unpaid sellers of their claims therefore have a toehold in both
Article 2 and Article 9.
134. Lien creditors are not within the class of beneficial intervenors in Part V of
Article 9. Their claims, preserved through § 9-311, must be exercised through whatever
rights local law makes available. Section 9-311 provides:
Alienability of Debtor's Rights: Judicial Process
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by
way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or other
judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting
any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default.
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valid and perfected security interest in all of Family Furniture's sofas,
including sofas subsequently to be acquired from such as ABC. Once
ABC so designates the sofas in its contract with Family Furniture that
they become identified, Family Furniture acquires rights in this col-
lateral, and the interest of its secured lender attaches. So long as ABC
remains in possession, it is likely to have priority over the lender's
after-acquired property interest.' 5 Should ABC be required to consult
with this lender if it intends simply to retain the sofas without a statu-
tory resale? Should the lender be entitled to excess proceeds if the sofas
can be resold above contract price?
Here again the method of choice appears to be to avoid categorical
resolution of all cases as if they were all part of a unitary whole. The
seller who has never relinquished possession should not be burdened
by his buyer's other creditors.'36 Once the seller has delivered the con-
tract goods, unconditionally or under a merely contractual reservation
of title, on the other hand, his reacquisition should not divest rights
that vested fully during the buyer's possessory interlude. 3 7 As usual,
delivery on special condition, under a cash sale or a sale induced by
misrepresentation of solvency, creates the most difficulty. In these
transactions, for which Article 2 provides reclamation as an exclusive
remedy, accountability after reclamation seems at violence with the
language of section 2-702(3)': s and yet totally consistent with the
equitable nature of the reclaiming seller's underlying claim. In the
absence of firm guidance from the Code or from prior common law,
perhaps all of these conflicts should be resolved on the basis of the
particular equities of the particular parties in the particular circum-
stances in which they find themselves.
IV. The Priority of the Unpaid Seller's Rights against Other Takers
from the Buyer
The seller's proprietary claim to contract goods, even if valid, per-
fected, and enforceable, may nonetheless be subordinated to the claims
135. Problems of priority are explored at pp. 947-83 infra.
136. From a practical point of view, the 1972 Code, which requires junior lienors first
to locate and notify the seller qua secured creditor, diminishes the risk that withholding
sellers will become enmeshed in junior liens.
137. See pp. 953, 963 infra.
138. Section 2-702(3) provides, for the defrauded seller:
The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer
in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403).
Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them.
There is no parallel textual limitation on reclamation pursuant to a cash sale under § 2-
507(2).
The Yale Law Journal
of competing third parties who take through Family Furniture. This,
the question of priorities, is the last and most difficult inquiry con-
cerning the security implications of the sales transaction. The concept
of priorities is, of course, primarily associated with Article 9. Signifi-
cantly, section 9-113 appears to preserve Article 9 priority rules in their
entirety even for possessory security interests "arising solely under the
Article on Sales."'139 Although section 9-113 incorporates the governing
provisions of Article 2 for some cases, as in the determination of "the
rights of the secured party on default," there is no comparable cross-
reference to Article 2 provisions on priority. While it is true that
Article 2 has no section denominated "priorities," section 2-403 con-
tains a form of ordering for the cases within its bounds that is in-
distinguishable from the ordering scheme we customarily consider a
priorities framework.
1 40
The sales contract between Family Furniture and ABC creates op-
portunities for a variety of competing claimants under Family Furni-
ture, any or all of whom may contest ABC's rights to the contract sofas.
This array of claimants to priority is worth cataloguing. Family Furni-
ture, upon entry into the contract with ABC, may enter into resale
contracts with its customers, who will certainly qualify as buyers141 and
perhaps as buyers in the ordinary course of business. 42 ABC may also
be confronted by any one of several types of financiers of Family Furni-
ture. The first is a secured lender to Family Furniture with an after-
acquired property interest in inventory. At some point in the preced-
ing five years, Family Furniture may have entered into a secured
transaction whose collateral encompassed present and after-acquired
furniture, adequately described to include ABC's forthcoming ship-
ment.' 43 If this secured transaction is valid and perfected, it will auto-
matically attach and bring the ABC sofas within its ambit as soon as
139. Section 9-113. See J. WnrE & R. SuMM.%Es, supra note 124, at 781; Hogan, The
Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial Code: Massachusetts
Variety, 38 B.U.L. REV. 571, 583-84 (1958).
140. The Code nowhere defines a "priority." Taking it, however, to refer to the result
that is achieved upon the subordination of one interest to another, it is clear that
§ 2-403 provides rules for determining which out of several delimited interests is superior
to the other interests in the same collateral. As such, it seems appropriate to refer to the
rules of § 2-403 as "priority" rules.
141. Section 2-103(1)(a) provides:
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires .... Buyer" means a person who
buys or contracts to buy goods.
142. Section 1-201(9) provides in part that:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
143. Sections 9-204(1), 9-403(2).
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Family Furniture acquires rights therein.144 The second financier is an
enabling lender, that is, a lender who finances this very acquisition of
sofas, for which a security agreement is negotiated, a financing state-
ment filed, and value given. Once again, as soon as Family Furniture
acquires rights in the sofas, this security interest is fully perfected. 145
Moreover, if this enabling lender ensured through adequate tracing
that his funds were actually used to acquire rights in the new col-
lateral coming from ABC, he would qualify as a purchase money
lender.14 Finally, ABC may also be confronted with the claims of
other lenders who have neither an after-acquired property interest nor
an enabling interest, and who are therefore not technically direct
financiers, but who have taken and perhaps perfected a security interest
in the sofas at or after the time when Family Furniture acquires rights
in those sofas.
All of these competitors except the buyer are Article 9 secured credi-
tors147 as well as Article 2 purchasers. 48 The similarities between them
suggest that they be examined together, after an inquiry into the status
of the historically favored buyer in ordinary course.
A. Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business
Resale customers of Family Furniture are significant primarily when
they qualify as buyers in the ordinary course of business. The buyer in
the ordinary course of business is, according to section 1-201(9),
a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale
to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest
of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a
pawnbroker.
Both pre-Code law and the Code itself extend significant protection to
such buyers against the claims of competing third parties. 4 9
144. Section 9-203.
145. Id.
146. Section 9-107(b). On the subject of tracing, see 2 G. GIL MORE, supra note 29, at
781-82; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 100, at 27-31.
147. Sections 1-201(37), 9-102, 9-105(1).
148. Section 1-201(32).
149. 2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 29, at 678-79:
A general proposition, which is as true as any general proposition can be, is that
the good faith buyer in ordinary course of business will take free of any inventory
security interest, no matter how cunningly the security agreement may have been
drafted. All modern statutes which authorize inventory financing arrangements-such
as the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the Factor's Lien Acts and Article 9 of the Code-
expressly provide that such buyers take free of the security interest. The older chattel
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1. ABC in Possession Before Delivery
Even while ABC remains in possession of the sofas-during the
period after identification of the sofas to the contract and before their
delivery to Family Furniture-resale claimants may arise. Family Furni-
ture, certainly a person in the business of selling goods of that kind,
may well enter into resale contracts before it takes delivery of the sofas
and may even arrange for direct delivery from ABC to its customers.
Family Furniture's customers are likely to know little and care less
about the contractual arrangement between ABC and Family Furni-
ture. There is nothing explicit in the Code's definition of buyer in
ordinary course that would require that such a buyer take delivery of
the goods.15i Early drafts of the Code seemed to couple the definition
of a buyer in ordinary course with delivery. Section 2-403(4) of the 1950
draft defined such a buyer as one "to whom goods are shipped pursuant
to a pre-existing contract or one to whom they are delivered on
credit."'15 But this language was dropped when the definition was
moved to Article 1.1S2 Delivery to Family Furniture's resale customers
could now be made a prerequisite only by implication. But that im-
plication cannot universally be correct, since the same Article 1 def-
inition is expressly coupled in the priority scheme of Article 7 with
an explicit requirement that the buyer also take delivery.153 Although
the implication might be drawn on a case-by-case basis from the open-
ended criteria of buying "in ordinary course" and "in good faith," even
this reading is inconsistent with Article 7. Family Furniture's resale
customers can be buyers in the ordinary course of business in ab-
sentia. 54
The question of possession by a buyer in ordinary course is not dis-
positive on the priority between ABC and Family Furniture's cus-
tomers. The issue of priority must also take into account whether
mortgage acts (in states where they were construed to allow inventory financing)
typically contained no such express provision; indeed, most of these statutes pro-
ceeded on the assumption that a properly filed mortgage was "good against the
world." Nevertheless, even under such chattel mortgage acts the courts regularly and
with remarkably few deviations protected the buyer and held against the mortgagee.
150. See note 142 supra.
151. U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (Spring 1950 draft). No definition of "buyer in ordinary course
of business" exists in the May 1949 draft of the U.C.C.
152. The definition "with revisions" was moved to Article I in the September 1950
revisions to the U.C.C. and appeared in its present form as § 1-201(9) in the 1951 Proposed
Final Draft.
153. Section 7-504(2)(b).
154. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 696; Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (and Related Matters), 1974 WIs. L.
REV. 1, 20. But see Smith, supra note 120, at 61.
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Family Furniture must be in possession of the sofas before it can convey
them to a buyer in ordinary course. Unfortunately, this issue of priority
appears on first glance to be dramatically different under Articles 2
and 9. Under section 2-403, the professional status of the dealer and
the innocence of the buyer will defeat the prior rights only of a person
who has delivered goods to the dealer or acquiesced in the dealer's con-
tinued possession.1 55 If Family Furniture never received the sofas from
ABC, section 2-403 gives it no power to transfer ABC's rights to them.
The parallel section in Article 9, section 9-307, has no such require-
ment of delivery. 5 6 Moreover, if ABC's seller's lien is an Article 9
security interest for priority purposes, as section 9-113 seems to re-
quire,15 7 then a buyer in ordinary course apparently prevails despite
perfection and despite his knowledge of the existence of the security
interest. Although the Code does not take up the question of whether
a security interest "arising solely under" Article 2 for purposes of
section 9-113 is to be considered a security interest "created by his
seller" for purposes of section 9-307, the thrust of section 9-307's
limitation seems directed not at the hybrid security interest brought
into Article 9 through section 9-113, but rather at the question of the
parties between whom the security interest arose.'5 s
This literal approach to section 9-307, however, may not be disposi-
tive. Comment 1 to section 9-307 hints that section 2-403, not section
9-307, should control. 59 Moreover, although "delivery" may not be an
155. Section 2-403(2). The definition of "entrusting" "includes any delivery and any
acquiescence in retention." Section 2-403(3). There is no reason to think that it is possible
to have entrusting without possession. See DePaulo v. Williams Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 10
LEBANON COUNTY [PA.] LEGAL J. 465 (1965). See also UNIFORM SALES AcT § 25. Although the
definition of "purchaser" in § 1-201(33) is broad enough to include a buyer in ordinary
course, there are sufficient reasons not to read the rights of a buyer in ordinary course
under § 2-403(l) as broader than the rights accorded such a buyer under § 2-403(2). See
note 178 infra.
156. Since § 9-307 states only that "[a] buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes
free of a security interest created by his seller," there is nothing that would expressly limit
the applicability of that section to situations in which the seller already had possession.
See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 696.
157. See pp. 916-17 supra.
158. Skilton, supra note 154, at 7-8; cf. R. HENSON, supra note 29, at 109 n.91.
159. The last paragraph of Comment I to § 9-307 observes that "Article 2 (Sales) states
general rules on purchase of goods from a seller with defective or voidable title (Section
2-403)." The Code, however, is replete with unclear references on this topic. For example,
Comment 2 to § 2-403 observes that:
As to entrusting by a secured party, subsection (2) is limited by the more specific
provisions of Section 9-307(1), which deny protection to a person buying farm products
from a person engaged in farming operations.
And Comment 4 to § 9-306 suggests that the distinction is one of technical application.
See generally J. WHITE & R. Sua.-mm~s, supra note 124, at 945-46. Compare National Shaw-
mut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967) with Charles S. Martin Distrib. Co.
v. Banks, Ill Ga. App. 538, 142 S.E.2d 309 (1965) and Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes,
194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961).
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aspect of buying in ordinary course, passage of title-a generally dis-
credited indicium under the Code-arguably is. 16° Section 1-201(9) de-
fines a "[b]uyer in ordinary course of business" as one who takes by
way of "sale,"'161 which section 2-106(1) defines in turn as "the passing
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-40j).1o02 Both
section 2-106(1) and section 2-401 are Article 2 definitions, applicable
to Article 9 by analogy rather than by fiat; indeed, the use of the term
"buyer in ordinary course" in section 2-403(2) suggests that actual
passage of title is not necessary before such a buyer can emerge even in
Article 2.103 In any case, this definitional ambiguity can be used so as
to take into account a variety of equitable factors. With ABC still in
possession, the battleground will unmistakably be section 9-307(l),104
and it appears that this definitional flexibility is available to reach an
appropriate result. °3 Alternatively, concepts like good faith or ordinary
course of business are sufficiently flexible that a court can accommodate
160. See Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-39, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106
(1973); Jackson & Kronman, supra note 100, at 23; Skilton supra note 154, at 17-19.
161. Section 1-201(9) states:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and with-
out knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. All persons
who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be
deemed to be persons in the business of selling goods of that kind. "Buying" may be
for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured credit and in-
cludes receiving goods or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but
does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction
of a money debt.
Although not entirely clear, the language of "sale" and "buys" would not seem to cover
a "contract to sell." Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-39, 208
N.W.2d 97, 106 (1973) (discussing whether one can become buyer in ordinary course
merely by entering into contract to buy or sell).
162. Perhaps contrary to this is § 2-103(1), which states that "[i]n this Article unless
the context otherwise requires (a) 'Buyer' means a person who buys or contracts to buy
goods." It is not an easy jump, however, to conclude that the definition of the term
"buyer" should influence the definition of the separate term "buyer in ordinary course."
163. Since an "entrusting" includes retention of possession without title, it would be
impossible for such an entrustee to pass title. That is, if title were indeed crucial, no
buyer in the ordinary course of business could ever arise until after § 2-403(2) had
operated, which it could not do for lack of a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
Such an absurdity, which would reduce § 2-403(2) to a nullity, suggests that, at least
here, title cannot be decisive.
164. As we have suggested, see pp. 950-51 supra, § 2-403(2) will be inoperative until
Family Furniture acquires possession.
165. Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 240, 208 N.W.2d 97, 107 (1973):
While the Commercial Code, as pointed out above, does not require that in all cases
the buyer actually take delivery in order to have a buyer in ordinary course of business
status, sound policy considerations in the instant situation would seem to dictate that
the rights of a secured creditor ought not be impaired in the absence of a physical
transfer or assignment of the goods.
See Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply Against a
Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. LAW. 153 (1977).
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a variety of outcomes that turn on a comparison of equities, rather than
on absolute priorities. Still, however limited ABC's risk may be, from
time to time, and case by case, that risk is unmistakably larger under
Article 9 than it is under Article 2.
2. ABC Delivers Goods Unconditionally or on Special Condition
Delivery of the sofas to Family Furniture makes all the difference to
the position of a buyer in ordinary course. After delivery, both section
2-403(2) and section 9-307(1) provide that the buyer in ordinary course
prevails.1 6 Neither games with title 67 nor a transaction that is a cash
sale or fraudulent sale 0 s makes any difference. Family Furniture has
been entrusted with possession through "any delivery" and is thereby
able "to transfer all rights ... to a buyer in ordinary course of business."
3. ABC Reacquires Goods from Family Furniture
If ABC reacquires the sofas from Family Furniture at a time when
Family Furniture has entered into contracts with would-be buyers in
the ordinary course of business, the apparent priority given a buyer in
ordinary course under sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(l) cannot be con-
sidered apart from the question of the buyer's remedies. Whether or
not, as Professor Corbin often reminded us, "possession is nine points
in law," it is significant that ABC, and not Family Furniture, has pos-
session. It is helpful to recall that the contract rights of buyers are
rarely proprietary. Even a buyer with title cannot ordinarily replevy
goods or specifically require their delivery unless they are unique.169
166. The buyer in the ordinary course of business prevails both under § 2-403(2), be-
cause Family Furniture has been entrusted with possession and is entitled to "transfer all
rights of the entruster," and under § 9-307(l), because he "takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though the
buyer knows of its existence." Although, as we noted, see pp. 951-52 supra, the fact that
title has not yet passed might be used to suggest that § 9-307(1) is not triggered, such a
literal reading should be rejected here, where there is clearly ample reason to have § 9-
307(1) reach a result harmonious with § 2-403(2).
167. Section 2-403(3) makes clear that subsection (2) applies "regardless of any condi-
tion expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence," and § 2-401(1) itself
limits retention of title after delivery to the "reservation of a security interest."
168. Section 2-403(3) makes clear that subsection (2) applies "regardless of whether the
procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such
as to be larcenous under the criminal law." Comment 2 notes that "[tJhe principle is
extended in subsection (3) to fit with the abolition of the old law of 'cash sale' by sub-
section (1)(c)."
169. Section 2-711(2) states:
Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this Article
(Section 2-502); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as provided
in this Article (Section 2-716).
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Thus unless something extraordinary distinguishes ABC's sofas, Family
Furniture's failure to execute the sales contract relegates its customer
to a claim for monetary damages; 170 neither prepayment by the cus-
tomer nor the insolvency of Family Furniture automatically creates
proprietary rights in the customer. If ABC has no notice of the claims
of Family Furniture's customers, its good faith dealings with Family
Furniture should therefore be protected. Even though its reacquisition
is technically not a sale,171 ABC should have no greater duty of inquiry
than would be imposed on any other party dealing with a seller in
possession of sold goods. If ABC has actual notice or if its retaking
otherwise does not comport with the requirements of good faith, then
principles of estoppel would override ABC's normal claim to priority. 72
In the majority of cases, however, latent claims of ownership should
Section 2-716 states:
Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or Replevin
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other
proper circumstances.
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as
to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after
reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has been
made or tendered.
Section 2-502, the other provision referred to in § 2-711(2), is a very narrow provision,
effective only "if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first in-
stallment on their price." It reads, in full:
Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not been shipped a
buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of goods in which he has a special prop-
erty under the provisions of the immediately preceding section may on making ania
keeping good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover them from the
seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first install-
ment on their price.
(2) If the identification creating his special property has been made by the buyer
he acquires the right to recover the goods only if they conform to the contract for
sale.
Even if a buyer could meet the stringent 10-day precondition, § 2-502(2) applies only where
the buyer has "a special property under" § 2-501, thus further limiting the proprietary
hopes of a buyer.
170. Assuming that the buyer cannot utilize § 2-502 or § 2-716, his remedies are those
specified in § 2-711(1):
Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects
or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and with
respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the
buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering
so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected
whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section 2-713).
171. Section 2-401(4).
172. Section 1-103 explicitly preserves "principles of law and equity, including . . . the
law relative to ... estoppel."
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not stand in the way of the reasonable implementation or modification
of the contract between ABC and Family Furniture. 173
In sum, it would appear that delivery is the decisive fact for the
priority status of a buyer in ordinary course. When Family Furniture is
in possession, a buyer in ordinary course is a sure winner. When ABC
is in possession, either before delivery or after reacquisition, it should
prevail, unless equitable notions of estoppel and good faith persuade a
court otherwise.
B. Purchasers
Analysis of the priority rights of other purchasers from Family Furni-
ture tends to proceed from the assumption of a baseline established by
the priority rights of a buyer in ordinary course. Both under pre-Code
law and the Code itself, the status of a buyer in ordinary course is as
favorable as that accorded to any third-party claimant.17 4 As one moves
beyond that baseline to a more detailed inquiry, however, the answers
are not so easy. Purchasers, even secured parties, come in a variety of
hues, a situation that is reflected in the elaborate scheme of priority
rules enunciated in Article 9. Not surprisingly, then, while delivery
should remain a key variable, other significant factors will affect the
resolution of priority conflicts when Family Furniture is in possession.
1. ABC in Possession Before Delivery
From what has been said, ABC should, before delivery, have priority
over the secured parties claiming through Family Furniture. Such
purchasers should not prevail when buyers in ordinary course do not. 75
Here it is the language of Article 2 that creates the initial difficulty.
The opening sentences of section 2-403(1), by contrast with the later
sentences and subsections, do not require that a good faith purchaser
for value have purchased from a person in possession.' 78 This omission
173. Cf. § 2-402(2) (continuation of state "ostensible ownership" laws, reflecting con-
tinuing mistrust of latent ownership claims). See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 100, at
9-10. See also pp. 972-73 infra.
174. As for the Code, see Skilton, supra note 154, at 2. As for pre-Code law, see UNI-
FORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr § 9; UNIFORM SALE ACT §§ 24-25; UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTs
Aar § 9(2). See also note 149 supra.
175. See pp. 950-53 supra.
176. Section 2-403(1) reads:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
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cannot be read to impair ABC's rights. On one level, it is possible to
avoid the issue by manipulation of title: despite identification, Family
Furniture probably has neither partial nor voidable title, and pur-
chasers from Family Furniture are thus disqualified from protection
against ABC. 17 On another level, it is sensible to read section 2-403 as
part of a unitary whole, with trade-offs that respond to a variety of
equitable claims. There is no discernible reason of policy to put
ABC at risk against mere purchasers and ordinary buyers when even
buyers in the ordinary course of business must prove delivery in order
to defeat ABC.' 78 Furthermore, the drafting style of the early part of
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
177. See Toyomenka, Inc. v. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 432 F.2d 722, 728 (4th Cir.
1970).
178. As we have seen, a buyer in ordinary course cannot prevail before his seller
acquires possession under § 2-403(2). See pp. 950-51 supra; cf. Kripke, supra note 165, at
157 (arguing that, in context of more than one isolated section, apparent ownership
through possession should be read into § 9-307(1) to harmonize it with 2-403(2)).
A review of the drafting history of § 2-403(1) suggests that the requirement of delivery
to a person with "voidable title," expressly set forth in that subsection's third sentence,
should likewise be read into the preceding sentence. The predecessor to §§ 2-403(2) and
(3) first made its appearance in the 1950 draft of the Code. No provision, however, dealt
with "voidable title" at that time, and a comment observed that "[s]ince the great bulk
of claims of 'prior owners' are those of secured lenders, the rights of purchasers other than
buyers in ordinary course are left to the Article regulating the relations between secured
lenders and third parties (Article 9)." Section 2-403, Comment 4 (1950 draft).
The voidable title concept was inserted in the 1952 draft of the Code, reading, as it
does today, "[a] person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value." Section 2-403(1) (1952 draft). There is no indication, however,
that this insertion was intended to broaden the protection accorded either to buyers in
ordinary course under § 2-403(2) or to purchasers in general. McDonnell, The Floating
Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 449 (1977) ("it is more likely that
the drafters of the Code, having decided to emphasize the entrustment concept and having
encountered difficulties in reducing the nuances of bona fide purchase to statutory form,
had decided to leave the latter doctrine where it stood in the case law"); cf. 1 NaW YoRK
LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE 227 (1955)
(discussing the protection given to a "buyer in ordinary course of business" in Article 2;
refers only to § 2-403). The New York Law Revision Commission apparently read § 2-403(1)
in this manner, for it suggested adding the following provision to that subsection:
When a transferor has a right to recover goods from a transferee, the transferee's
title shall be deemed to be voidable rather than void if the transferor delivered the
goods to the transferee pursuant to a transaction intended by the transferor to transfer
ownership in the goods. This rule includes but is not limited to cases where
(a) the transferor is deceived as to the identity of the transferee, or
(b) the transferor delivers the goods in exchange for a check which is not collected
because of insufficient funds;
(c) the delivery of the goods is procured through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law.
NEW YORK LAv REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956, REPORT RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 383 (1956) (emphasis added). This proposal clearly viewed the issue of
voidable title as depending on delivery of the goods to the transferee. Far from repudiating
this reading, the Permanent Editorial Board, in revising § 2-403(1) in 1956 for what be-
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section 2-403(1) is precisely what one would expect for an open-ended
rule that directs courts to inquire into comparative equities. The
drafters' views about the indeterminacy of title are well matched by
their description of the good faith purchaser. Good faith, under Article
2, has a range of meaning that depends on the commercial competence
of the actor whose conduct is under scrutiny. 179 The relationship of
good faith to notice of claims of ownership is normally articulated
as a holy trinity of good faith, lack of notice, and value.'80 Section
2-403(1) speaks only of good faith and value.'18  But there is no reason
not to consider notice an aspect of good faith 8 2 and considerable
advantage in thus avoiding hard-line distinctions between knowledge,
notice, and duty to inquire. 8 3
came the 1957 Official Text of the Code, acknowledged that its changes were made
"[f]ollowing suggestions of the New York Commission .... " 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 53 (1957).
179. Section 1-201(19) is an open-ended definition in which "'[good faith' means
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Section 2-103(1)(b) adds an
extra requirement for a merchant: "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade." See Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).
180. The definition of a "buyer in ordinary course of business," for example, requires
that the party be "in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party." Section 1-201(9). For other
examples, see §§ 2-403(2), 3-302, 6-110, 8-301, 8-302, 9-301(1), 9-307(2), 9-308(a).
181. Section 2-403(1) states only:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
A "purchaser" is defined in § 1-201(33) only as "a person who takes by purchase"; while
§ 1-201(32) states that "'[p]urchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mort-
gage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an
interest in property." See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1243-44
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
182. See, e.g., Ranchers 9- Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313 (Colo.
Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 553 P.2d 799 (1976) (en banc); Farnsworth, Good Faith Per-
formance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
CHI. L. REV. 666, 668 (1963).
183. Section 1-201(25) states:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists.
See, e.g., National Car Rental v. Fox, 18 Ariz. App. 160, 500 P.2d 1148 (1972); Greater
Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1965); Jordan v.
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Do the priority provisions of Article 9 upset ABC's largely favorable,
although open-ended, solution under Article 2? Here it is necessary to
separate the categories of purchasers. Article 9 provides that "conflict-
ing security interest[s]," including interests that arise through an after-
acquired property clause, are to be subordinated to a perfected pur-
chase money security interest in the same collateral.18 4 ABC is probably
protected by this priority scheme. Its hybrid security interest either is,
or is enough like, an Article 9 purchase money security interest to
entitle it to such status.'8 1 Its continued possession qualifies as perfec-
tion, 86 and section 9-113 explicitly negates the requirement of a filed
financing statement.187 Since the sofas are inventory from Family Fur-
niture's point of view, however, ABC's priority might also depend on
Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 634, 637, 156 NAV.2d 778, 783, 785 (1968); Landrum v. Armbruster,
28 N.C. App. 250, 254, 220 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1976); McDonnell, supra note 178, at 457. Lack
of knowledge (or of reason to know) of outstanding claims was necessary to the common
law bona fide purchaser. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels 9= Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1243
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Johnson v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 135,
136 (5th Cir. 1953); UNIFOFW SALES Acr § 24; F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES
188-97 (2d ed. 1908); Note, What Constitutes a Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Without
Notice?, 36 COLumn. L. Rav. 658 (1936).
184. Sections 9-312(3) and (4) read:
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a
conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor re-
ceives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder
of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing state-
ment covering the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing
made by the purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of
the 21 day period where the purchase money security interest is temporarily
perfected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within
five years before the-debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to
acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describ-
ing such inventory by item or type.
(4) A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the pur-
chase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
185. Section 9-107(a) states:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price ....
We have concluded, see pp. 916-17 supra, that the seller in possession prior to delivery is
the typical Article 2 security interest holder. As such, his interest dearly meets the defini-
tion of a purchase money security interest in § 9-107(a). Cf. 2 G. GLMor.a, supra note 29, at
780-84 (general discussion of requirements of purchase money security interests). But see
Shanker, supra note 79, at 104.
186. See p. 917 supra.
187. See p. 938 supra.
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compliance with the notification requirement of section 9-312(3). s s But
the requirement of subsection (3) that an earlier secured party be in-
formed of the intentions of the purchase money secured party does not
make sense with respect to a seller's possessory lien.8 9 Notification is
designed to alert an earlier secured lender to the possible impairment of
his collateral. 190 If Family Furniture makes prepayment for the ABC
sofas with proceeds of the sale of earlier collateral, then there is no
diversion, since prepayment is likely to ensure delivery and ABC there-
by loses its status as a purchase money seller.' 91 Without prepayment,
188. Section 9-312(3) states:
A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a con-
flicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor re-
ceives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder
of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing state-
ment covering the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing
made by the purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of
the 21 day period where the purchase money security interest is temporarily
perfected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within
five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to
acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describ-
ing such inventory by item or type.
189. It is plausible to read § 9-312(3)(c) as validating the priority of a purchase money
security interest over conflicting security interests, without notice, so long as the debtor
has not received possession of the inventory, since the notification period of that subsection
expires only on receipt of possession of the collateral by the debtor. Professor Gilmore
notes that "'[r]eceives possession' is evidently meant to refer to the moment when the
goods are physically delivered at the debtor's place of business." 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 29, at 787. But cf. § 9-312, Comment 3 (indicating that § 9-312(3) contains "the addi-
tional requirement that the purchase money secured party give notification, as stated in
subsection (3), to any other secured party who filed earlier for the same item or type of
inventory").
190. Comment 3 to § 9-312 observes:
The reason for the additional requirement of notification is that typically the arrange-
ment between an inventory secured party and his debtor will require the secured
party to make periodic advances against incoming inventory or periodic releases of
old inventory as new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the
secured party for advances even though he has already given a security interest in
the inventory to another secured party. The notification requirement protects the
inventory financer in such a situation: if he has received notification, he will pre-
sumably not make an advance; if he has not received notification (or if the other in-
terest does not qualify as a purchase money interest), any advance he may make will
have priority.
See 2 G. GIMoRE, supra note 29, at 789-90.
191. A purchase money security interest exists only "to the extent" that a security in-
terest is "taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price."
Section 9-107(a). To the extent that Family Furniture has prepaid for the sofas, ABC is
disabled from taking or retaining a security interest that secures that part of the price. Cf.
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 784 n.9, 787 n.4 (fractional purchase money interests can-
not total more than purchase price).
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on the other hand, the collateral of the earlier secured creditor has not
yet been impaired. Moreover, the requirement of notification is tied in
time to filing or automatic perfection without filing, neither of which
describes ABC's perfection status.1 92 Section 9-312(3) should therefore
be read to postpone the obligation of notification until the debtor
receives possession of the secured inventory, a reading that it is possible
to extract out of subsection (3)(c).
193
The use or misuse of proceeds suggests an alternate route to priority
that Family Furniture's earlier secured creditor may pursue. Article 9
allows a security interest to continue despite transfer or other disposi-
tion of the secured collateral and to encompass the proceeds of disposi-
tion and the proceeds of proceeds. 94 Read literally, section 9-306 brings
ABC's sofas within the umbrella of the earlier security interest if the
sofas are acquired in part by moneys traceably derived from earlier
sales of secured furniture. A court may assist ABC by requiring
meticulous accounting to trace cash proceeds.195 But more fundamen-
tally, ABC should be able to persuade a court that, despite identifica-
tion, no section 9-306 disposition has yet occurred.196
It is important to be clear about the position of ABC in these con-
frontations. If no payments are made before delivery or if the buyer
otherwise repudiates, ABC should not be accountable to Family Furni-
ture's pre-existing secured creditors before it exercises its Article 2
rights on default, which section 9-113 expressly preserves. Although the
priority provisions of Article 9, which section 9-113 does not exclude,
leave ABC's rights in jeopardy to some indeterminate extent, mere
indeterminacy should not demote ABC's rights against old-value
192. Section 9-312(3)(b) identifies conflicting security interests that are entitled to
notification by comparing the dates of their filings with the date of the filing or auto-
matic perfection of the purchase money secured party.
193. See note 189 supra.
194. Section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" as including "whatever is received upon the
sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." Section 9-306(2)
states:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collat-
eral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposi-
tion was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the
debtor.
195. Cf. 2 G. GiLMORE, supra note 29, at 735-36 (discussing "tracing" of deposits in bank
accounts).
196. Section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is received upon the sale, ex-
change, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." As we have seen, it ap-
pears that a "sale" covers only the actual passing of title, see pp. 951-52 supra. As-
suming that a similar limiting construction could be placed on the terms "exchange,
collection or other disposition," then ABC should be able to persuade a court that
Family Furniture has not yet "received" anything.
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secured creditors. There is no reason to treat this indeterminacy as
abrogating the established rights of sellers to withhold delivery under
pre-Code law. Even if ABC is itself in default in refusing to deliver,
Article 2's policy of protecting those who deal with sellers in possession
of sold goods' 97 should take priority over the claims of the pre-existing
secured creditors of Family Furniture.
Family Furniture may, however, have entered into a financial ar-
rangement that may prove more troublesome to ABC: one involving an
enabling lender.198 Since this interest attaches as soon as Family Furni-
ture acquires rights in the sofas, 199 it would appear that the enabling
lender's security interest attaches and is perfected simultaneously with
ABC's possessory seller's interest. The enabling lender and ABC are
both new value parties in their relationship to Family Furniture, al-
though the sum of their new value interests cannot exceed the purchase
197. Section 2-403 states:
Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods; "Entrusting"
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the ex-
tent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under
a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of pos-
session regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or
acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the pos-
sessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal
law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by
the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and
Documents of Title (Article 7).
See generally Peters, supra note 8, at 235-38.
Section 2-402 is also applicable to protect "creditors" of a seller who have retained
possession of sold goods for more than a commercially reasonable time. See Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 100, at 19-20. However, § 2-402 is not available to subsequent
creditors. See McCann v. Capital Sa'. Bank & Trust Co., 117 Vt. 179, 89 A.2d 123 (1952);
Peters, supra note 8, at 239.
198. The term "enabling lender" refers to the holder of a purchase money security
interest acquired under § 9-107(b):
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such
value is in fact so used.
199. Section 9-203(l)(c).
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price of the sofas. 200 But unless the lender's funds are actually used to
acquire rights in the new collateral, he does not qualify as a purchase
money secured party and therefore falls back into the prior secured
lender category discussed above. 201 That demotion reflects the enabling
lender's ready access to commercial devices such as joint payee checks
that can minimize awkward confrontations. The lender financing a
particular acquisition has a greater opportunity to identify his debtor's
seller than does the seller to discover his buyer's financier. If the
enabling lender's funds have actually been used to pay, in whole or in
part, for the sofas that Family Furniture has contracted to buy, that
lender would be a purchase money lender (and ABC, to that extent,
not). Such an enabling lender has a compelling claim, 20 2 but the ques-
tion remains whether the lender can insist that ABC deliver if Family
Furniture repudiates or if ABC wrongfully withholds the sofas. There
is no statutory answer, although Family Furniture is not necessarily in
default against the enabling lender. Manipulation of what constitutes
the necessary identification will avoid the issue and will likely protect
ABC and takers under ABC even in ABC's weakest case, its own de-
fault.
By way of summary, the Code's unpaid seller, despite his possessory
stance, is exposed to a number of serious competitors. Under both
Articles 2 and 9, identification of goods creates rights in the buyer to
which third parties may assert claims. Identification is the linchpin
around which the seller's vulnerability turns. Default in the sales con-
tract is not crucial in and of itself. A seller's default in selecting non-
conforming goods does not prevent identification, although his delivery
to another buyer might do so. But purchasers from the seller in posses-
sion derive protection under Article 2 without regard to identification,
at least so long as their sellers are merchants.20 3 A buyer's default, in
failing to pay or in otherwise repudiating, does not reverse the acquisi-
tion of rights in the sold goods and therefore does not divest security in-
200. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 784 n.9, 787 n.4. Professor Gilmore correctly notes
that "if the collateral depreciates in value or is sold in foreclosure proceedings for less
than the original purchase price, the purchase-money interest (or interests) could be more
than 100 per cent of present value or of the proceeds realized on disposition." Id. at
784 n.9.
201. This follows from the "in fact so used" language of § 9-107(b). For a discussion of
the tracing requirement, see J. WHiTE : R. SUMiMERS, supra note 124, at 915-16; Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 100, at 28.
202. To the extent that the enabling lender has advanced money to ABC (virtually a
prerequisite to the status of enabling lender under § 9-107(b)), ABC has both the sofas
and the money. Such a situation would be a classic restitutionary case.
203. Section 2-403(l), (2); see Peters, supra note 8, at 235-39.
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terests or other claims that attach under Article 9.204 But the prescrip-
tive tendencies of Article 9 should not be used to force a rigid solution.
There is no reason why Williston's unpaid seller becomes undeserving
once goods have become identified. The Code should be read to protect
such a seller unless the particular facts of a case suggest something akin
to estoppel, as, for example, when entrusting has been manifested by
conduct, or acquiescence in conduct, short of physical transfer. But
such examples should be viewed as exceptional and should in each case
require evaluation of commercial setting, purpose, and effect. In other
words, security interests arising solely under Article 2 are entitled to
be adjudicated, even for priority purposes, by the flexible methodology
of Article 2.
2. ABC Delivers Goods Unconditionally
After unconditional delivery to Family Furniture, the unremarkable
status of ABC as a seller out of possession leaves it subordinated to other
secured creditors.20 5 It matters little whether ABC is deemed to be an
unsecured creditor or a secured creditor not accorded automatic perfec-
tion by section 9-113 and not otherwise protected, and it matters little
whether the focus is placed on Article 9 alone or on sections 2-403(1)
and (4) in addition. ABC's "right" to "cancel" and to have the goods
returned is, after delivery, subject to the superior rights of all other
secured creditors of Family Furniture claiming an interest in the sofas.
3. ABC Delivers Goods on Special Condition
The priority posture of competing purchasers after a delivery on
special condition is more complex. At common law, the cash seller
prevailed over competing parties who claimed through the buyer since
no title was thought to pass until payment was made.2 0 6 The common
law treatment of the credit sale induced by fraud, which gave the buyer
voidable title that the seller could regain by appropriate means, allowed
204. Section 2-401(4) deals only with the revesting of title; it is silent on the divesting
of acquired rights that are not dependent on title.
205. See pp. 912, 917-18 supra; R. Nows'rRom, supra note 41, at 498-500; Peters, supra
note 8, at 218-23. As such, this simply continues pre-Code law. See, e.g., Southern Lumber
Co. v. Colvin, 104 Ark. 130, 148 S.W. 495 (1912); Gilmore, supra note 60, at 1060.
206. This, at least, was the theory. See, e.g., Sprague Canning Mach. Co. v. Fuller, 158
F. 588 (5th Cir. 1908); Kirk v. Madsen, 240 Iowa 532, 36 N.V.2d 757 (1949); McAuliffe &
Burke Co. v. Gallagher, 258 Mass. 215, 154 N.E. 755 (1927); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 150 Or. 172, 38 P.2d 48 (1934), aff'd on rehearing, 150 Or. 172, 203, 43
P.2d 1078 (1935); L. VOLD, supra note 61, at 161; Corman, supra note 60, at 56-59. Professor
Gilmore, however, noted that the cash sale theory was "almost never applied against good
faith purchasers in a commercial setting." Gilmore, supra note 60, at 1061; see note 62
supra.
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the buyer to defeat the retaking by resale to a good faith purchaser,
which generally required new consideration or detrimental reliance.207
Absent such infusions of new value, creditors had to stand in the
unenviable shoes of the defrauding buyer.208
Under the Code the cash sale is no longer treated more favorably
than the fraudulent sale, if in fact it ever was. Not only has the Code
expressly demoted the importance of title,209 but, as we have already
noted, it has also assimilated the cash sale doctrine to the fraudulent
sale doctrine.
210
It is less clear, however, how much the Code has changed the law with
respect to the fraudulent sales transaction. Section 2-702(3) directs us
to section 2-403 to determine the rights of a "good faith purchaser. '2 11
That section, in turn, deals with the rights of a "good faith purchaser
for value," leaving to Article 9 the rights of "other purchasers. ' 212
(Despite the implicit directive of section 9-113 that Article 2 security
interests are subject to Article 9 for priority purposes, this express
treatment of priorities in section 2-403 should control.)
Section 2-403(1) implicitly abolishes the reclamation right of a seller
caught in a fraudulent sales transaction when faced with the competing
claim of a party who qualifies as a good faith purchaser for value and
207. See, e.g., Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573, 10 N.W. 900 (1881);
Gilbert v. Hudson, 4 Me. 345 (1826); 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 448-57; Gilmore,
supra note 60, at 1060; Peters, supra note 8, at 222 n.71; Note, supra note 79, at 758; cf.
Braucher, supra note 60, at 1283-84 (discussing pre-Code law).
208. See, e.g., Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573, 578-79, 10 N.W. 900, 903
(1881); McAuliffe & Burke Co. v. Gallagher, 258 Mass. 215, 154 N.E. 755 (1927); Goodwin
v. Mass. Loan SL Trust Co., 152 Mass. 189, 25 N.E. 100 (1890); Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156
Pa. 258, 27 A. 300 (1893); 3 S. WILLISrON, supra note 35, at 396-401. But see Kranert v.
Simon, 65 Ill. 344 (1872).
209. Sections 2-401, 9-202. See p. 912 supra.
210. See pp. 924-25 supra.
211. Section 2-702(3) reads:
-The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer
in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403).
Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them.
212. Subsections 2-403(1) and (4) read:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the
extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer
a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by
the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Docu-
ments of Title (Article 7).
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explicitly abolishes the reclamation right of a cash seller in such a
situation t.2 a The extent to which pre-Code law has been changed, then,
rests on the scope to be given the phrase "good faith purchaser for
value." 14 Section 2-403(1), as it has been interpreted in In re Samuels
& Co.,21 gives priority to any purchaser who meets the apparently
literal requirements of a good faith purchaser for value, including a
prior secured lender with an after-acquired property interest.216
As interpreted in In re Sarnuels & Co., the change from common law,
and from section 24 of the Uniform Sales Act, is enormous. The group
of protected takers is expanded not only from buyers to purchasers, but
also from a group that gave new money to a group that may have done
nothing since the delivery of the goods to the buyer-or, indeed, may
213. Section 2-403(1) establishes that "[a] person with voidable title has power to
transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value." It explicitly declares that the
purchaser has such power even though, inter alia:
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
Section 2-702(3) expressly subjects the reclamation right of a seller caught in a fraudulent
sales transaction to "the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser
under this Article (Section 2-403)." See generally Peters, supra note 8, at 221-22.
214. See pp. 963-64 supra.
215. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels E, Co.), 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
216. Id. at 1241, 1242-44. In re Samuels d Co. is perhaps the most famous of these
cases; it is by no means the only one, and its result conforms with the majority of cases.
See United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1974) (apparently
leaving open, however, what would have happened if demand for reclamation had been
made within 10 days, id. at 1068); In re Daley, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 433 (D. Mass. 1975)
(bankruptcy judge); In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1107 (D. Mass. 1967) (bank-
ruptcy referee); Stratton Sale Barn, Inc. v. Reed, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 922 (U.S.D.A. 1969); Gen-
eral Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidwell Indus., Inc., 565 P.2d 868 (Ariz. 1977); First Nat'l Bank
v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203 (1972); Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner,
236 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Iowa 1975); First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives,
Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 622-24, 179 S.E.2d 850, 853 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 278 N.C. 703,
181 S.E.2d 601 (1971); Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Or. 20, 35 n.10, 444 P.2d
564, 571 n.10 (1968) (dictum).
Apparently, two cases have gone the other way. The first, In re American Food
Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (bankruptcy judge), has to be read to
be believed. The other is Zions First Nat'l Bank v. First Sec. Bank, N.A., 534 P.2d 900
(Utah 1975), which relied, without discussion of § 2-401(1), on "an agreement that title
would pass only upon payment." Id. at 902.
Academic commentators early reached precisely the same result as did Judge Godbold
in In re Samuels & Co. See W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UCC 304
(1964); Hogan, supra note 139, at 580-81; Kennedy, supra note 79, at 838; Note, supra note
79, at 757-58; ef. R. NORDSTRO.Mt, supra note 41, at 515 (discussing when, in terms of Code
definitions, subsequent purchaser will "terminate" seller's reclamation right). This result
had earlier been urged by L. VOLD, supra note 61, at 402-05. A cogent criticism of the
Sainuels result exists, however. See McDonnell, supra note 178. Legislative dissatisfaction
has resulted in a statutory reversal of Samuels with respect to livestock sales to meat-
packers. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-410, § 8, 7 U.S.C.A. § 196 (1976);
COLO. Rry. SeAT. §§ 4-2-401(5), 4-2-403(1.5), 4-2-511(4) (Supp. 1976).
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not even have known of the delivery. Although the pre-Code law ap-
parently protected good faith purchasers who injected new money,
2 17
the interpretation given section 2-403(1) in In re Samuels & Co. ex-
tends such protection to prior secured lenders with an after-acquired
property interest regardless of whether or .not there was detrimental
reliance.218 The Code never explicitly stated such a design in section
2-403.219 A comment to that section suggests, to the contrary, that the
drafters intended no expansion, observing that the "older loose concept
of good faith and wide definition of value combined to create apparent
good faith purchasers in many situations in which the result outraged
common sense." 220 This comment, an ill-fitting holdover from earlier
drafts, 22 ' may be a poor foothold, but there is nothing in the later draft-
217. See pp. 963-64 supra.
218. C.I.T. Corporation, the inventory financier of Samuels & Co., may well have
detrimentally relied on the incoming cattle, in that it was counting on the incoming cattle
to keep the collateral pool at nearly the same level-a substitution of collateral in which
the financier releases proceeds of accounts in return for the new additions to inventory
and makes weekly credit decisions on that basis. See generally Note, After-Acquired
Property Security Interests in Bankruptcy: A Substitution of Collateral Defense of the
U.C.C., 77 YALE L.J. 139 (1967). Cf. Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827, 831
(Ist Cir. 1951) (discussing "entity theory"-"a 'floating mass', the component elements of
which may be constantly changing without affecting the identity of the res"). Assuming,
as seems probable, that C.I.T. Corporation was adequately monitoring the weekly status
of Samuels SL Co., see note 226 infra, and was making credit decisions based on that status,
C.I.T. probably could have shown sufficient detrimental reliance to entitle it to prevail
as a good faith purchaser for new value. See McDonnell, supra note 178, at 455 ("If, in
fact, the financier is making credit decisions on the basis of the new assets, reliance would
not be difficult to document.") In re Samuels & Co., however, consistent with other case
law, did not examine the question of detrimental reliance, but stopped simply with the
observation that C.I.T. Corporation met the literal definition of good faith purchaser for
value. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
219. See McDonnell, supra note 178, at 443-60. Two comments to the 1949 draft of
what now is § 2-403 suggest, instead, that the original purpose behind that section was to
balance the competing equities between the reclaiming seller and competing purchasers.
One comment observed that "[t]his Article flatly rejects the general concept of the 'cash
sale', offering instead protection to the seller by its specific requirements for 'good faith
purchase.'" Section 2-405, Comment 3 (May 1949 draft). The second comment, through
its emphasis on "appearances," carried the implication of necessary reliance on the part of
the competing purchaser. "The problem underlying this entire section is one of good faith
purchase based on grounds which are a combination of reasonable appearances and such
action or acquiescence by an original claimant as will justify holding him to answer for
those appearances." Id., Comment 5. There is no express indication in later drafts of the
Code that the drafters ever repudiated these sentiments.
220. Section 2-403, Comment 3.
221. The comment was attached to § 2-403 when that section read as follows:
Purchase of Limited Interest; Good Faith Purchase; "Entrusting"; "Buyer in Ordinary
Course of Business".
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor has or has power to
transfer but a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the
interest purchased and as between the parties any purchase is subject to its own terms.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a person who deals in goods of that
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ing history of the Code to indicate its repudiation by the drafters. 222
The drafting style of Article 2 and the generally open-ended defini-
tion of the good faith purchaser for value suggest that section 2-403(1)
should be read to protect purchasers only if they, like buyers in the
ordinary course of business (to whose status delivery is a prerequisite),
extend new value to Family Furniture in reliance on the delivery of
the sofas.223 We earlier observed that, before delivery, ABC should
usually prevail over third-party claimants whose interests attach by
kind gives that person power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of posses-
sion regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or
acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the
possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the
criminal law.
(4) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" includes a person to whom goods are
shipped pursuant to a pre-existing contract or one to whom they are delivered on
credit, but does not include a pawnbroker or a person taking from one not dealing
in goods of that kind or a person taking an interest in inventory in bulk or as security
or a person taking at an hour or under other circumstances which negate good faith
or a person purchasing from a farmer.
(5) The extent to which other purchasers take free of the rights of a secured lender
is governed by the Article on Secured Commercial Transactions (Article 9).
U.C.C. § 2-403 (Spring 1950 draft). Comment 4 to that section suggested that "the rights of
purchasers other than buyers in ordinary course are left to [the article on secured transac-
tions]."
222. Indeed, Justice Braucher has suggested that a "true reading" of § 2-403 would
exclude an "unconscious purchaser" from the status of a bona fide purchaser for value.
Countryman, supra note 109, at 458 n.119 (1971). This appears to accord with what we
know of Karl Llewellyn's view. See UNIFORMx REvsD SALES Acr § 58, Comment, at 196-97
(proposed final draft No. 1, 1944) (argues for abolition of cash sale doctrine, suggesting
"[t]he results really needed can be better and more predictably reached by delimiting the
field of the purchase which will be protected"); REVIsED UNIFORM SALES ACT § 25, Com-
ment, at 157-58 (2d draft 1941); McDonnell, supra note 178, at 435-60.
223. Professor McDonnell concludes:
Since explicit language of exclusion is not present, a requirement that the purchaser
in some practical way rely on the assets lie is receiving must be inferred in order to
exclude "unconscious purchasers" from protection. This construction is permissible
since the Code's definition of "purchaser" is applicable "unless the context otherwise
rcquires." Previously, a concrete subsequent transfer to the BFP [bona fide purchaser]
after the true owner had parted with his goods was evidence of such reliance. The
history of the Code's drafting shows no intent to eliminate the reliance element. If,
in fact, no such reliance is present, then based on the history and function of the
BFP principle, the lienor ought to lose.
McDonnell, supra note 178, at 452-53.
We are aware of the contrary arguments of Professor Vold, see L. VOLD, supra note 61,
at 403-04, but we prefer a case-by-case determination of whether the creditor has det-
rimentally relied on the new collateral to a flat rule protecting the creditor with an
after-acquired property interest, who may not even have known of the new collateral.
Where two innocent people are invohed, a flexible approach seems preferable to a flat
rule. Cf. Jordan v. Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 637, 156 N.W.2d 778, 785 (1968) (relying on "a
rule of long standing that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a
third, the one whose conduct, act, or omission enables such third person to occasion the
loss must sustain it if the other party acted in good faith without knowledge of the facts and
altered his position to his detriment").
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way of Family Furniture's acquisition of rights in the sofas.224 The fact
of delivery changes none of the equities, except that it becomes possible
for purchasers to extend new value in reliance on the fact that Family
Furniture is in possession of the sofas (much as it becomes possible for
buyers in ordinary course so to buy)..2 25 These are the only purchasers
who could have changed their position as a result of delivery to Family
Furniture, and who could be hurt in a way in which they could not
have been hurt before delivery, by ABC's exercise of its reclamation
rights. There is no reason of policy to read section 2-403(1) more
broadly; 22 a narrow reading makes the class of protected purchasers no
broader than the class of protected buyers and so harmonizes the various
subsections of section 2-403.227 The language is open-ended enough to
justify relying on the more flexible approach that the pervasive weigh-
ing of equities in Article 2 encourages.
Such a construction of "good faith purchasers for value" within the
scope of section 2-403(1), requiring some form of new value in reliance
on the delivery of the sofas, still leaves room for "other purchasers"
224. See pp. 962-63 supra.
225. Cf. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidwell Indus., Inc., 565 P.2d 868, 871-72 (Ariz.
1977): "By allowing the mobile homes to remain on Parkwood's lot without filing notice of
its claim of security interest, Tidwell could well have misled G.E.C.C. as well as other
creditors of Parkwood into believing that Parkwood possessed greater assets than was the
case."
226. A reading of § 2-403(1) such as we have proposed would also seem to facilitate the
implementation of another Code policy, that of encouraging inventory financiers to
monitor their debtors. Although the Code in § 9-205 repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U.S. 353 (1925), which voided as fraudulent a chattel security interest in inventory
where the debtor was given unfettered dominion or control over the collateral, it none-
theless approves of Benedict's underlying concept of monitoring as beneficial not only to
the inventory financier, but also to his debtor and to other creditors of the debtor. See
§ 9-205, Comment 3. Thus, § 9-306(4) places commingled proceeds received more than 10
days before the institution of insolvency proceedings beyond the reach of a floating lienor.
Professor Gilmore opined that
the Code draftsmen recognized as sound the idea that a secured lender, particularly if
he takes as security the inventory and receivables which are the most liquid assets of
any enterprise, should, not only in his own interest but in the interest of other
creditors, be under compulsion to pay close attention to the course of the debtor's
affairs.... If self-interest does not do the job, §9-306(4)(d) supplies the incentive.
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 1340; see also 1 id. at 361-62. Professor Gilmore suggests
that such impetus to policing may, however, not be sufficient. Id. at 364.
A reading of § 2-403(1) that would protect floating lienors only if they detrimentally
relied on the existence of the incoming collateral would, like § 9-306(4), provide an added
impetus to police. If the floating lienor remains an "unconscious purchaser," he will lose
his § 2-403(1) priority; if, however, he polices, he should be able to demonstrate without
much difficulty that he has detrimentally relied, and thus is entitled to § 2-403(l)
priority. Cf. McDonnell, supra note 178, at 451-56 (discussion of when detrimental reliance
shown). The reading we propose of § 2-403(l), in contrast to a broad application of the
literal definition of "value" in § 1-201(44), would therefore facilitate the implementation
of the Code's policy of encouraging monitoring by the floating lienor.
227. See pp. 950-51 and note 178 supra.
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under section 2-403(4) and even other "good faith purchasers" under
section 2-702(3), whose priority status is controlled by Article 9. Signif-
icant among these would be the secured creditor with an after-acquired
property interest.228 Since we have considered the reclamation right to
be sufficiently like an "interest . . . which secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation" to treat it as a security interest,2 29 it would
seem to follow that it is also sufficiently like a security interest "taken
or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price" to qualify as a purchase money security interest.2 30 So long
as the security interest exists (which is so long as ABC is given its
ostensible power of reclamation), the interest is perfected without filing
by virtue of section 9-113,231 and ABC should prevail as a purchase
money security interest over competing good faith purchasers, includ-
ing the secured lender with an after-acquired property interest. Al-
though the phrasing of section 9-312(3)(b) fits this situation awkward-
ly,23 2 it should be read to assure such priority. Even though section
9-312(3) does not allow purchase money security interests in inventory
a grace period during which perfection is maintained after delivery,
which subsection (4) does allow noninventory collateral,2 33 the reasons
for that difference have no application here. Comment 3 to section
9-312 observes:
The reason for the additional requirement of notification is that
typically the arrangement between an inventory secured party and
his debtor will require the secured party to make periodic advances
against incoming inventory or periodic releases of old inventory as
new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the
228. Without some extra showing, such a creditor will not be able to establish tile
extension of new value in reliance on the delivery of the new collateral.
229. Section 1-201(37); see pp. 926-28 supra.
230. Section 9-107(a); see pp. 958-60 supra.
231. See p. 916 supra.
232. Section 9-312(3)(b) states:
A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a con-
flicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder
of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing state-
ment covering the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing
made by the purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of
the 21 day period where the purchase money security interest is temporarily
perfected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of Section 9-304) ....
233. Section 9-312(4) reads:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase
money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the
collateral or within ten days thereafter.
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secured party for advances even though he has already given a
security interest in the inventory to another secured party. The
notification requirement protects the inventory financer in such a
situation: if he has received notification, he will presumably not
make an advance; if he has not received notification .... any
advance he may make will have priority.
In this instance, the inventory financier can achieve the same priority
with respect to the incoming collateral by monitoring that collateral or
otherwise relying on its presence. In such a situation, the inventory
financier should be indifferent as to the payment status of the seller
of the collateral, for in all instances he will have priority as a good faith
purchaser for value under section 2-403(1), and the priority conflict
will never reach section 9-312(3).234 If he does not so rely during the
relevant time, when it may be presumed that he knows that recently
acquired collateral may be subject to this reclamation right, it would
appear that he has not been hurt by the absence of notification. Be-
cause the priority accorded on reliance under section 2-403(1) serves a
protective function equivalent to notification, there is no reason to
require further notification as a prerequisite to ABC's priority under
section 9-312(3).235
The status of an enabling lender is a bit more complicated. Just as
in the case of the seller-in-possession, 236 there is no reason why an
enabling lender should prevail if he has not taken precautions to
ensure that the seller actually receives the enabling advance. This is
reflected in Article 9's demotion of such an enabling lender to the
status of an ordinary secured party; 237 the seller, logically, would ap-
pear to remain in such circumstances "like" a purchase money seller,
since he, and not the enabling lender, is actually "financing" the
transaction. The same result should be reached under Article 2, either
by considering the enabling lender as a "prior" purchaser unable to
avail himself of the status of "good faith purchaser for value" within
section 2-403(1) or, perhaps more easily, by considering such carelessness
on the part of the enabling lender as an equitable factor that impugns
his "good faith" under section 2-103(l)(b).
23
8
234. See pp. 964, 967-68 supra.
235. A similar rationale appears to underlie the absence of a notification provision in
§ 9-312(4). Comment 3 to that section continues by observing that "[s]ince an arrangement
for periodic advances against incoming property is unusual outside the inventory field, no
notification requirement is included in subsection (4)."
236. See pp. 961-62 supra.
237. See p. 962 supra.
238. The result of this is to suggest that any third party who wishes to prevail even
though his new value is extended prior to physical delivery-and thus prior to the time a
buyer in the ordinary course of business would be able to prevail under § 2-403(2)-can do
so only by complying with the enabling lender provisions of Article 9.
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If, on the other hand, the enabling lender has prepaid ABC directly,
then ABC is not a seller on credit and is unable to avail itself of section
2-702(2) at all. Likewise, the situation of ABC as a cash seller is far
different if the check is that of the enabling lender instead of Family
Furniture. To trigger any right of reclamation under section 2-507(2),
the check of the enabling lender would have to be dishonored, since it
is now the financial status of the enabling lender and not that of Family
Furniture that is on the line. In the unlikely event that the enabling
lender's check is dishonored (and Family Furniture does not step into
the breach and pay), there is no reason to accord the enabling lender
any rights against ABC at all. Indeed, there is no reason to treat him
as an enabling lender; with the dishonoring of the check, he should be
disqualified even from the status of a lender.
A transaction involving an enabling lender engages a third pos-
sibility. The enabling lender may have paid ABC in part for the sofas,
thereby becoming, pro tanto, a true enabling lender. 23 9 Family Furni-
ture, however, may fail to pay the remainder of the contract price for
any of the reasons that would ordinarily trigger ABC's reclamation
right. If the enabling lender, having qualified under Article 9, is con-
sidered a "good faith purchaser for value" within the meaning of sec-
tion 2-403(1) because of the enabling nature of his money-money
clearly advanced in reliance on the delivery of the goods-then the
enabling lender should achieve "priority" under this Article 2 provi-
sion to the extent of his enabling advance.
4. ABC Reacquires Goods From Family Furniture
The priority rights of secured creditors in the situation in which
ABC has repossessed the sofas are even more intractable than in the
situations discussed thus far. With respect to buyers in ordinary course,
as we observed above, resolution of priorities continues to turn on
specific rights to the contract goods,2 40 rights that may presuppose de-
livery to the buyer as well as to Family Furniture. Other competitors
are not so limited. The secured lender whose financing of Family
Furniture's inventory includes as collateral the sofas from ABC does
have, in contrast with a buyer, a specific right to goods as well as a
claim to money.2 4 1 If ABC's reacquisition relates back to no prior lien
239. See p. 962 supra.
240. See pp. 953-54 supra.
241. Section 9-503 provides:
Secured Party's Right to Take Possession After Default
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If
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other than the seller's automatic possessory lien, Family Furniture had
unlimited power to encumber its assets while it had title and possession.
Reacquisition by ABC is then a disposition of collateral in which the
secured party's interest continues,242 unless ABC can find shelter some-
where in Article 9.
If the security interest was unperfected when ABC took the sofas
back, then ABC should be protected against this secret lien. The
provisions of section 9-301 enumerate those who prevail over an un-
perfected security interest and include
in the case of goods ... a person who is not a secured party and
who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary course of
business ... to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery
of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected.
This language admittedly does not fit like a glove. ABC is neither a
transferee in bulk nor a buyer, because of section 2-401(4); and ABC,
although hardly a donee, may not have given value in connection with
the redelivery of the collateral, especially if the retaking was occasioned
by a dispute about the quality of ABC's original tender. But both his-
tory and commercial sense support a reading of section 9-301 that en-
compasses ABC. At common law, courts regularly cast an equally
suspicious eye on creditors who left their chattel mortgagors in posses-
sion without recordation as on buyers who left their sellers in pos-
session. In both cases, the secrecy of the latent claim of ownership was
held to create an aura of fraud from which innocent parties deserved to
be protected. 243 Similarly, in modem law in general and the Code in
the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to as-
semble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be
designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Wiihout removal a secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose
of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 9-504.
The right to retain the goods, however, may be limited. See § 9-505. This section also
provides the mechanism whereby the secured party may "propose to retain the collateral
in satisfaction of the obligation." Section 9-505(2).
242. Section 9-306(2) provides:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collat-
eral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition
was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.
Since reacquisition is not a "sale," § 2-401(4), ABC cannot rely on § 9-307(l). Although
reacquisition is not a "sale" for purposes of § 9-306(2) either, it appears to fit easily in
the phrase "other disposition." Section 2-326(2) provides a special rule for goods sold "on
approval," but that does not appear to fit ABC's status either.
243. For creditors leaving their chattel mortgagors in possession, see, e.g., Twyne's
Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601); Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawl 275, 9 Am.
Dec. 346 (Pa. 1819); 1 G. GILMOR, supra note 29, at 24, 438-39. For buyers leaving their
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particular, a commercial party should not escape standard commercial
responsibilities for perfection at the expense of another party acting in
good faith whose injury the commercial lender might easily have
avoided.2-44 Section 9-301(l)(c) should sensibly be taken to include
transferees such as reacquiring sellers and transactions instinct with
value, so long as reacquisition is made in commercial good faith.
Family Furniture's secured lenders who have perfected stand in a
different position. After perfection, such lenders can lose their security
interests in the ABC reacquisition only if ABC is a buyer in the
ordinary course of business or if the secured lender is deemed in some
way to have authorized this disposition.2-4 5 ABC's reacquisition does
not and should not qualify as ordinary course buying; "ordinary
course" must mean something more than ordinary good faith,246 and
"buying," under section 1-201, contemplates new value rather than
ordinary value.2 47 And, at least where the reacquisition occurred be-
cause of Family Furniture's rejection or justified revocation, section
2-401(4) all but explicitly precludes ABC from the status of a buyer.248
sellers in possession, see, e.g., Southern Cal. Collection Co. v. Napkie, 106 Cal. App. 2d 565,
235 P.2d 434 (1951); McGann v. Capital Say. Bank & Trust Co., 117 Vt. 179, 89 A.2d 123
(1952); Coburn v. Drown, 114 Vt. 158, 40 A2d 528 (1945); an Act against fraudulent
Deeds, Alienations, &c., 113 Eliz. 1 c.5 (1570); UNIFORM SALES Ac §§ 25-26 (1950); 2 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 351-502; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 100, at 9-10.
244. See, e.g., Wabasso State Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 251 N.W.2d 321 (Minn.
1976); Tumber v. Automation Design & Mfg. Corp., 130 N.J. Super. 5, 11-13, 324 A.2d 602,
606 (1974); cf. Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708, 710 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972) (policy of Code should be to
protect party who does not, or should not be expected to, foresee and guard against given
risk).
245. Section 9-306(2) states:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collat-
eral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition
was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.
Section 9-307(1) states:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other than
a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
246. Section 1-201(9) requires that a person be in "good faith" and that he buy "in
ordinary course." See Makransky v. Long Island Reo Truck Co., 58 Misc. 2d 338, 295
N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
247. Section 1-201(9) concludes that
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured
credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a pre-existing con-
tract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or
partial satisfaction of a money debt.
248. Section 2-401(4) states:
A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the goods, whether or
not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance revests title to the goods in the
seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law and is not a "sale".
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The issue of the lender's authorization of ABC's reacquisition is not
so clearcut; the concept of authority lends itself to a case-by-case com-
parison of equities.2,49 Consider the following variations in the interests
of the secured lender and the circumstances of the reacquisition. The
secured lender may be an earlier lender with an after-acquired property
clause or an enabling lender financing this particular shipment of
sofas. The reacquisition may involve an exchange of goods for money
or goods for goods that leaves Family Furniture's net assets unchanged,
or it may involve a repossession threatening the forfeiture of moneys
paid as well as further claims for monetary damages. It is not possible
to predict, by statutory fiat or academic introspection, the variety of
interactions that may occur. Nor is it possible to foresee in whose hands
the goods will be when the claim of the secured lender surfaces. When
the goods can be located with ABC, perhaps it is appropriate to require
ABC to make some concrete showing of authority to dispose before its
seller's lien revives; such authorization might be found not only in the
terms of the security agreement between Family Furniture and its
lender but also in the conduct of the parties and the usage of the
trade. 250 It is reasonable to condition ABC's seller's lien in this way
because ABC, as a commercial seller, can be held to a duty to discover
and understand the consequences of his buyer's financial arrange-
ments.
251
It is not quite so reasonable to apply this rationale if ABC resells,
as is the custom of sellers. Buyers from ABC ordinarily have no way
of tracing the rights of takers under Family Furniture, perfected or not,
since they ordinarily have no way of identifying Family Furniture as a
249. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, 424 S.W.2d
409, 413 (Ky. 1968); cf. United States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1033,
1034 (D.N.D. 1972) (reliance on particular facts in deciding that sale was "authorized");
Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96, 97 (iowa 1973) (question of authority
to sell collateral is for trier of fact); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental System, Inc.,
35 App. Div. 2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970) (issue of fact on question of implied authority).
250. See, e.g., Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 1066-68, 511 S.W.2d
645, 647 (1974); Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973); Hemp-
stead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental System, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970).
But cf. Vermilion County Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, I 1111. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352
(1969) (clause referring to proceeds cannot be used to establish consent to sale; discussing
limited use of course of dealing or trade usage in establishing authority); Wabasso State
Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 251 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 1976) (relying on § 1-205(4) to
conclude that "when the security agreement requires prior written authorization, it can-
not be proved by a course of dealing").
251. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972); Mattek v. Malofsky, 42 Wis. 2d 16, 165
N.V.2d 406 (1969); cf. National Car Rental v. Fox, 18 Ariz. App. 160, 500 P.2d 1148 (1972)
(reliance on familiarity with business to deny status of good faith purchaser for value).
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prior owner..2 52 Article 9's section on proceeds teaches that a security
interest, once properly effected, survives unauthorized transfers with-
out number.23 Logically, that teaching is impeccable: neither theft
nor unauthorized disposition can be cured by the passage of time or
distance. In practice, however, the survival of the security interest con-
flicts with the policy against secret liens..2 5 4 The 1972 revision of the
proceeds section strikes a suggestive balance among these competing
claims by requiring a secured creditor to reperfect when collateral in
the form of proceeds changes identity or location.2 55 That solution does
not apply, in terms, to the problems of priority raised by reacquisition,
but it does suggest that a court can read "authority" so as to do com-
mercial justice without doing violence to the basic principles
2 - 6 of
Article 9.
If third-party claims survive ABC's reacquisition of the contract
goods from Family Furniture, resale by ABC that is unauthorized by
Family Furniture's creditors means that ABC's buyers, even if they are
buyers in the ordinary course of business, take subject to security in-
252. Examination of the files for recorded security interests will avail a buyer for
ABC only if he knows to check under Family Furniture, an unlikely eventuality.
253. Section 9-306(2) states:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the dis-
position was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise,
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the
debtor.
Section 9-307(1) is no longer of any possible use, since the security interests we are con-
cerned with-those held by creditors of Family Furniture-are not "created" by ABC. See,
e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967); Skilton, supra
note 154, at 7-9.
254. See, e.g., In re Automated Bookbinding Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 553 (4th Cir.
1972); Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARV. L. REv. 588,
610-11 (1949).
255. Section 9-306(3), in the 1972 version, reads:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest if the
interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected security
interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor
unless
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are
collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office
or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the proceeds
are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the financing
statement indicates the types of property constituting the proceeds; or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are
identifiable cash proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of the
ten day period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest in proceeds can be perfected only
by the methods or under the circumstances permitted in this Article for original
collateral of the same type.
256. Compare the suggestion of the ultimate dissent in Stowers v. Mahon (In re
Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1249 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
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terests under Family Furniture. Resale after reacquisition thus involves
a serious risk of liability for breach of warranty of title.2 57 The
magnitude of this risk depends in large measure on the fungibility of
the contract goods and on the volume of the seller's business, since a
reclaiming third-party lienholder must always carry the burden of
identifying goods as collateral. It depends as well on Family Furniture's
financial responsibility, since only default by Family Furniture will
send its creditors in hot pursuit of remote collateral.
The foregoing discussion has focused only on the possible con-
tinuing interests of secured parties vis-4-vis ABC as a repossessing seller.
We observed earlier that the reacquiring seller who repossesses because
of nonpayment might also be assimilated to the status of an unpaid
secured party and thus be subject to Article 9 via section 9-113.2 8 As a
secured party with a security interest belatedly perfected by possession,
ABC encounters the same array of takers under Family Furniture as it
did as a seller. But since ABC is now an Article 9 party, dealing with
customers and lenders under Article 9, its priority position is not
necessarily the same.
Article 9 unfortunately has few words of wisdom to enlighten secured
parties about the consequences of transactions that move backwards,
rather than forwards. There are, however, some clues. On the one
hand, the proceeds section, as previously observed, makes security in-
terests more difficult to detach than to attach.250 On the other hand,
the assignment section, section 9-318, supports exercise of considerable
commercial discretion.2 60 Clearly, that section does not apply in terms
257. Sections 2-312(1) and (2) state:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller
that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or
encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (I) will be excluded or modified only by specific
language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that the person
selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right
or title as he or a third person may have.
258. See pp. 933-34 supra.
259. See p. 975 supra.
260. Sections 9-318(1) and (2) read:
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert de-
fenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 9-206 the rights of an
assignee are subject to
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and any
defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which
accrues before the account debtor receives notification of the assignment.
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned contract has
not been fully earned by performance, and notwithstanding notification of the assign-
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to reacquisition by a seller of goods; it deals specifically only with as-
signment of accounts. Its guidelines are nonetheless instructive because
they are unusually flexible for Article 9. In subsection (2), neither
assignment of an account nor notification of the account debtor of the
assignment defeats the continuing right of the parties to the underlying
contract to make "any modification of or substitution for the contract
. . . in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards." Even a provision in the security agreement interdicting
such a modification or substitution and calling it an event of breach
does not make a good faith modification or substitution ineffective
against the assignee. At the very least, section 9-318 establishes that
subsequent secured transactions do not necessarily lock the original
parties into a contract that they decide in good faith to alter. If modi-
fication is a tolerable form of alteration, presumably abandonment
would be, too; and then default cannot be far behind.261 What good
faith requires and what is commercially reasonable of course need
elucidation.2 0 2 But the message of section 9-318 lends itself to the com-
parison of equities and thus furnishes a useful counterweight to the
more rigid instructions of the proceeds section.
Finally, priority rules about one recurrent type of reacquisition are
codified in Article 9. If a seller of goods has transferred to a secured
party either an account or chattel paper generated by his sale, and if the
goods are reacquired by the seller or by the secured party, section
9-306(5) applies..2 63 In the ABC-Family Furniture transaction, one situa-
ment, any modification of or substitution for the contract made in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards is effective against an assignee un-
less the account debtor has otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding
rights under the modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide that
such modification or substitution is a breach by the assignor.
261. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 1117-21.
262. See id. at 1107-10, 1120-21; cf. Brice v. Bannister, 3 Q.B.D. 569, 579-80 (1878) (dis-
senting opinion of Brett, L.J.) (favoring facilitating good faith modification by "parties to
an unfilled contract," even when confronted by claim of equitable assignee).
263. Section 9-306(5) reads:
If a sale of goods results in an account or chattel paper which is transferred by the
seller to a secured party, and if the goods are returned to or are repossessed by the
seller or the secured party, the following rules determine priorities:
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of sale, for an indebtedness of the
seller which is still unpaid, the original security interest attaches again to the
goods and continues as a perfected security interest if it was perfected at the
time when the goods were sold. If the security interest was originally perfected
by a filing which is still effective, nothing further is required to continue the
perfected status; in any other case, the secured party must take possession of
the returned or repossessed goods or must file.
(b) An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper has a security interest in the goods
against the transferor. Such security interest is prior to a security interest
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tion that section 9-306(5) contemplates is a sale by Family Furniture to
one of its customers, on time, which creates either an account or chattel
paper. If Family Furniture transfers the account or chattel paper to
another secured party and then reacquires the sofa from its customer,
section 9-306(5) describes the rights of ABC as inventory financier
against the transferee secured party.
Because the rules of section 9-306(5) are complex or downright
mysterious, they warrant some explication.2 4  At the moment before
reacquisition by Family Furniture, the section contemplates the simul-
taneous existence of two or three security interests. Family Furniture is
a secured debtor on its inventory collateral to ABC, the inventory
secured party (here we assume that ABC has taken or is deemed under
section 9-113 to have an Article 9 security interest); Family Furniture
is also a secured debtor on its transfer of accounts or chattel paper to
the transferee secured party.2 r, Family Furniture is a secured debtor in
both of these transactions, but the collateral is not the same, since
ABC's basic collateral is sofas, while the transferee's basic collateral is
the monetary claim to collect from Family Furniture's customer. If
ABC's customer received the sofa on open credit and without further
ado, then there are no other security interests. The customer's obliga-
tion to pay is an account, which is transferable and which has been
transferred. ABC would have an interest in this account as proceeds
but would lose to the transferee if the assignment of accounts were the
first to be perfected.2 6 6 If, on the other hand, the customer signed a
asserted under paragraph (a) to the extent that the transferee of the chattel
paper was entitled to priority under Section 9-308.
(c) An unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest in the goods against
the transferor. Such security interest is subordinate to a security interest as-
serted under paragraph (a).
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under paragraph (b) or
(c) must be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor and
purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods.
264. See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 736-42; Lord, Rights of Secured
Creditors in Returned and Repossessed Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Study of Section 9-306(5), 15 Duq. L. REv. 165 (1976-77).
265. Section 9-106 states that an "'[a]ccount' means any right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel
paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance." Section 9-105(l)(b) states that
"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obliga-
tion and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods, but a charter or other con-
tract involving the use or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction
is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument
or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel
paper ....
266. Section 9-312(5) provides:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases of
purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set
forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting security
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security agreement, then there is a third security interest. In this third
secured transaction, Family Furniture occupies the position of secured
creditor, the customer is the debtor, and the sofa is the collateral. In
the hands of Family Furniture, this security interest, which is chattel
paper, is once again an asset to which ABC has a claim as proceeds.
Transfer of the chattel paper establishes and perfects the secured
transaction between Family Furniture and the transferee, and assigns
to the transferee Family Furniture's rights against the customer. The
transferee for new value who takes possession has a perfected security
interest in the chattel paper prior to the inventory financier's proceeds
interest, 207 but he does not automatically have a perfected security in-
terest in the sofa. If the sofa was bought not for personal purposes but
to furnish, say, an office, perfection requires filing.
208
At the moment after reacquisition of the sofa by Family Furniture
or its transferee, section 9-306(5) contemplates the simultaneous exis-
tence of all of the above, plus more. ABC's security interest in the sofa,
which in all probability had been divested by the earlier sale to the
customer, 269 reattaches.2 70 Significantly, ABC's lien revives without ap-
parent regard to the customer's status or to the reason for the customer's
loss of the sofa. Although retaking by Family Furniture thus appears
interests in the same collateral shall be determined according to the following rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the
collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is
earlier, provided that there is no period thereafter when there is neither
filing nor perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has
priority.
See 2 G. GILuMORE, supra note 29, at 735.
267. Section 9-308 provides:
Purchase of Chattel Paper and Instruments
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value and takes
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority over a security in-
terest in the chattel paper or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and temporary perfec-
tion) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as to proceeds) if he acts without knowledge
that the specific paper or instrument is subject to a security interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest
(Section 9-306) even though he knows that the specific paper or instrument is sub-
ject to the security interest.
268. The holder of chattel paper has an interest not only in the paper, but also in
the goods, § 9-105(l)(b); Lord, supra note 264, at 170; cf. Levie, Security Interests in Chattel
Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935, 939, 953 (1969) (security interest in chattel paper includes "by
definition an interest in the rights of [a dealer] to the collateral which secures the first
level transaction"). Section 9-302(l)(d) excepts from the filing requirement "a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods." See § 9-302(2); 2 G. GUMORE, supra note 29,
at 737-38.
269. See §§ 9-306(2); 9-307(1).
270. Section 9-306(5)0a).
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to improve ABC's priority against customers and to support the notion
that the status of buyer-in-due-course requires possession, retaking does
not otherwise do much to improve ABC's position. In particular, sec-
tion 9-306(5)(b) makes clear that the unpaid transferee of chattel paper,
holding a perfected prior interest in the chattel paper while the cus-
tomer had the sofa, now has a prior interest in the returned sofa as
well.2 71 Reacquisition by Family Furniture is only helpful to ABC in
that it may facilitate ABC's own reacquisition and thereby allow ABC
belatedly to perfect its security interest and possibly (though just barely
possibly) to take priority over a transferee of accounts who has been
even slower to perfect.27
2
These priority rules established by section 9-306(5) appear plausible
when read quickly. After all, customers do ordinarily take free of their
seller's security interests by virtue of section 9-307, and transfers of
chattel paper do ordinarily generate further proceeds that should amply
satisfy an inventory financier. In other words, ABC is made whole by
Family Furniture's receipt of new value from the transfer of the chattel
paper, since Family Furniture can be compelled to deliver to ABC the
moneys generated thereby. If ABC allows Family Furniture to squander
this money elsewhere, ABC cannot be heard to complain of its own
foolishness.
Section 9-306(5), however, is neither so simple nor so satisfactory. It
is odd that it covers the chattel paper financier who is a transferee from
the seller but is silent about the lender who directly finances the
customer and thus generates the chattel paper.273 It is even odder that
the mechanism for protecting the chattel paper transferee depends on
the creation by statutory fiat of new secured collateral. Before the
section 9-306(5) retaking, the transferee could not have exercised a
possessory right to the sofa upon the default of Family Furniture, its
debtor, since the sofa was not collateral between Family Furniture and
271. Section 9-306(5)(b) states:
An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper has a security interest in the goods against
the transferor. Such security interest is prior to a security interest asserted under
paragraph (a) to the extent that the transferee of the chattel paper was entitled to
priority under Section 9-308.
See generally 2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 29, at 737-39.
272. Under § 9-306(5)(c), a transferee of an account gets a security interest in the
returned goods. Although this security interest is subordinated to ABC's perfected security
interest, this does not aid ABC, for, if it were perfected, it already had priority over the
holder of the account prior to this time. See 2 G. GmLMORE, supra note 29, at 735, 741.
273. Professor Gilmore writes that the policy reasons remain the same, and that "there
is no discernable reason why the rule of subsection (a) should not apply in favor of a
secured party who had an interest in the goods even when there has not been a sub-
sequent transfer of the resulting receivables." 2 G. GIUMaoa, supra note 29, at 736. He
suggests that § 9-306(5) should be read to cover both situations. Id. at 737.
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the transferee.27 4 After the section 9-306(5) retaking, without amend-
ment of the security agreement, the sofa becomes collateral. What has
happened to the customer's rights to the sofa? Has the customer's
security interest been extinguished by the retaking? Surely not, accord-
ing to Part 5 of Article 9 27 5 The sofa has become a commercial foot-
ball, and any number can play. If Family Furniture defaults to ABC,
ABC can claim the sofa as security for the indebtedness of Family
Furniture; if Family Furniture defaults to the chattel paper transferee,
the transferee can claim the sofa as security for the indebtedness of
Family Furniture; if the customer defaults to Family Furniture or its
assignee, the chattel paper transferee, the chattel paper transferee can
claim the sofa as security for the indebtedness of the customer.
The rules of section 9-306(5) order the rights of claimants against
Family Furniture; they do not order, but arguably confuse, the rights
of the customer. If, for example, repossession from the customer was
improper, subsequent default by Family Furniture should not give
rights in the sofa to either ABC or the chattel paper transferee. If the
repossession was proper, in that it was consented to by the customer, it
may have been accomplished by the seller even though the seller is no
longer the effective secured party because of the assignment of the
chattel paper. Section 9-306(5) states that the statutory lien it creates
will require perfection for protection against purchasers of the returned
or repossessed goods.2 70 Thus the seller in possession can proceed to
resell (or to return the goods to ABC?) until the transferee files to give
notice of his claim to the sofa against Family Furniture as debtor. This
will be an unusual filing, to say the least, and, unless the transferee was
exceptionally clairvoyant, an unlikely event until after the retaking by
Family Furniture. - 77 For the earlier chattel paper transaction was
perfected as to the sofa, if there was a filing, by filing against the cus-
274. The transferee received the rights of Family Furniture as against the customer,
but, in that transaction, Family Furniture occupied the role of creditor, not debtor. In
the transaction that transfers the chattel paper to the transferee, Family Furniture is a
debtor, to be sure, but the sofa is not collateral securing that debt.
275. As a debtor, despite default, the customer has rights of redemption and rights
concerning liquidation. As a secured lender, the transferee of chattel paper, despite the
customer's default, has rights at least as a junior lienor, if he does not have priority.
276. Section 9-306(5)(d) requires that:
A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under paragraph (b) or (c) must
be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor and purchasers of the
returned or repossessed goods.
277. Cf. Skilton, supra note 154, at 9 (noting that § 9-306(5)(d) "contemplates a filing
as to the goods naming the dealer as debtor"). But see 2 G. GiLmORE, supra note 29, at
738 ("There is no reason, however, why the financing statement cannot be drafted so as
to cover both the chattel paper and the underlying goods in case of returns and reposses-
sions.")
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 907, 1978
tomer, a different debtor, and as to the monetary claim, not by filing
but by taking the papers . 2 73 Even if this unusual event can be brought
to pass, its payoff can hardly be clear. Resale purchasers at liquidation
sales, as after repossession, are protected by section 9-504 from other
junior liens if they buy in good faith;279 should they suddenly be
vulnerable to these odd liens, perfected or not? Buyers in ordinary
course are notoriously immune to perfection, particularly when their
sellers have created the disputed security interest; should they then be
forced to distinguish between security interests "created" consensually
and those "created" by statute?28 0 Section 9-306(5) is a maze of blind
alleys, a misguided venture into overly specific solutions for intractably
complex problems.
28 1.
Perhaps the best approach to section 9-306(5) is to treat it, with
respect, less as a set of binding directives than as a suggestive approach
to complex realities. What, then, could one take from the section? Re-
acquisition by sellers is commercially reasonable in a great variety of
circumstances, despite many competing interests. In sorting out these
competing claims, commercial law should facilitate modification and
substitution of collateral when collectibility is impaired.2812 But the
process of substitution should take into account the obligation to give
278. Section 9-305 provides that "[a] security interest in .. . chattel paper may be
perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral," a point that is re-
emphasized in § 9-302(l)(a). See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 737 ("If the secured part)'
had perfected his interest by taking possession of the chattel paper, lie would have to
reperfect his interest in the goods either by filing or by taking possession [of the goods].")
279. Section 9-504(4) provides that:
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition
transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the
security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate
thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though the
secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this Part or of any judicial
proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects
in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other
bidders or the person conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
280. We suggested earlier that the answer was no, see p. 951 supra. Comment 4 to
§ 9-306 appears to agree:
If the dealer thereafter sells the chattel to a buyer in ordinary course of business in
any of the foregoing cases [discussing § 9-306(5)], the buyer is fully protected under
Section 2-403(2) as well as under Section 9-307(1), whichever is technically applicable.
See also Skilton, supra note 154, at 8-9.
281. In a slightly different vein, Professor Gilmore has suggested that § 9-306(5) should
be used, by analogy, to cover transactions resulting in accounts or chattel paper, even if
there is no transfer, 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 736, and that "the same rules should
apply, by analogy," to a sale that gives rise to negotiable instruments, id. at 741.
282. This is clearly the rationale underlying § 9-306(5). See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
29, at 738, 741.
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notice of changes to innocent third parties.2 18 3 On this admittedly over-
simplified level, section 9-306(5) becomes spiritually a first cousin of
the assignment section, section 9-318. Issues of priority that cannot be
resolved categorically have to be managed by choosing among irrec-
oncilables as best we can.
This reading brings the rights of ABC as a hybrid secured party into
close alignment with its rights as an ordinary reacquiring seller. Other
things being equal, ABC's priority against other secured parties should
be governed by the first-to-file rule, so that ABC, perfected by repos-
session, should not be burdened by competing claims that remain un-
perfected at the time of its reacquisition. ABC, however, cannot avoid
the claims of those who have a perfected interest against Family Furni-
ture or Family Furniture's customers. Again, it is the latent claims of
the secured creditors of Family Furniture's customers that are most
troublesome. Although repossession by Family Furniture cannot ex-
tinguish such claims, courts have a special obligation to inquire into
possible arguments of estoppel in such cases. If repossession is triggered
by the customer's inability to pay, for example, a secured lender might
well be deemed to be on notice that default frequently leads to re-
possession and repossession frequently leads to resale. For the protection
of others more innocent, a secured lender's failure to intervene should
be deemed an acquiescence in the seller's repossession and an entrusting
of the collateral to the repossessing seller.
28 4
Revival of claims of ownership by a reacquiring seller of goods is
necessarily a perilous undertaking. So long as Article 9 is read with
sensitivity to commercial realities, it probably matters little whether the
original seller is thought to have or to regain a security interest. Either
way, reasonable commercial expectations will stand a reasonable
chance of protection. If Article 9 is read literally and applied peremp-
torily, on the other hand, no seller can safely reacquire goods without
an assurance of indemnity from a willing and solvent buyer. Such in-
demnities are likely to be awkward to acquire.
Conclusion
The world of the Uniform Commercial Code is a more complicated
world than the one for which Williston wrote the Uniform Sales Act
283. Cf. § 9-306(5)(d) (requirement of perfection of unpaid transferee's § 9-306(5)(b) or
(c) security interest "for protection against creditors of the transferor and purchasers of
the returned or repossessed goods").
284. Cf. § 9-306(2) (providing for continuation of security interests in collateral unless
disposition authorized). This, of course, would be true whether the lenders are those of
Family Furniture itself, or those of customers of Family Furniture.
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and the Treatise on Sales. The world of Article 9 on first reading-and
second and third-is, in turn, more intricate than the world of Article
2. This is due in part to the more resounding accomplishment, when
compared with prior law, that is Article 9. Yet it is due also to the fact
that Karl Llewellyn's original vision of Article 2 survived the process
of drafting and enactment largely intact, whereas the vision of
Llewellyn, Grant Gilmore, and Allison Dunham for Article 9 met
resistance from those who felt more secure in precision .s5 Professor
Gilmore has reminded, gently but repeatedly, that the inevitability of
change will render functionless a commercial statute too inflexible to
adapt.288 The structural simplicity of Article 2 enhances its capacity to
respond to the complexities of the real world, to the large and evolving
variety of "commercial" transactions. The capacity of Article 9 to adapt
to changing commercial realities depends on accommodating demands
for rigor in the short run and for transactional sense and adjustment to
new problems in the long run.
Just as rights under Article 2 must take into account competing
claims under Article 9, so too must those claims be read with an Article
2 understanding of the underlying obligation. So viewed, Article 9, like
Article 2, can provide commercial parties with a framework for achiev-
ing reasonable commercial ends with reasonable certainty. Commercial
statutes work better and live longer when they dispense organizing
principles that reasonably guide rather than detailed rules that in-
sistently bind.
In The Death of Contract, Professor Gilmore suggests that in the
development of law, as in literature and the arts, there are brief classical
periods in which "everything is neat, tidy and logical." 287 The drafting
of codes is one manifestation of the classical aspiration to a formal,
highly structured legal system. The reactions to the classical periods,
Professor Gilmore suggests, are romantic periods characterized by a
preference for an open-ended, improvisational approach to society. In
law, the romanticism of some legal realists urged the transformation of
all issues into questions of fact for resolution by juries. Neither or-
285. See Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 461, 472-73 (1967);
cf. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 85 (1977) (discussing influence of practicing
lawyers on drafting of Code).
286. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 285, at 85; Gilmore, supra note 3, at 461; Gil-
more, supra note 285, at 472-77; Gilmore, In Memorian: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813,
814-15 (1962); Gilmore, supra note 60, at 1121-22.
287. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRAcT 102 (1974).
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ganizing principles nor detailed rules were thought necessary or use-
ful.288
Commercial law is not well suited to either the classical or the
romantic models at their extremes. The learning from all of the great
commercial lawyers-Mansfield, Cardozo, Llewellyn, and Gilmore-has
always been that the legal system must draw on the commercial sense of
the transaction and the parties, in a process that must have boundaries
while retaining elasticity as well. Over twenty years ago, Professor Gil-
more noted that
[t]he only legal certainty is the certainty of legal change. But if we
keep our categories broad and flexible, we can, as lawyers, do a
good deal to see that the change which will come in any case is
helped into being, is integrated into the body of the law as part of
an ordered pattern and not left to come lurching and banging
destructively into the vulnerable framework of a too rigidly con-
ceived structure of doctrine, principles and rules.
2 9
A commercial code that is too ambitious, that purports alone to impose
order on the commercial world, will destroy itself.290 It will invite
avoidance and amendment and will fuel litigation. 291 Yet reasonably
construed, with a sense of history as well as of the present, a code can
also aid the growth of the commercial world by a combination of
guidance and flexibility.292 This, we believe, is the lesson that an
examination of transactions that straddle Articles 2 and 9 brings home
with particular clarity. Read literally and peremptorily, the Code
solutions vacillate in an almost schizophrenic manner, resulting from
the apparent inattention to the relation of Article 9 to Article 2. Yet
read sensibly, with an understanding not only of the scheme of Article
288. Id.
289. Gilmore, supra note 60, at 1121-22.
290. Professor Gilmore has quoted, with approval, the observation of Justice Story:
We ought not to permit ourselves to indulge in the theoretical extravagances of some
well-meaning philosophical jurists, who believe that all human concerns for the
future can be provided for in a code, speaking a definite language. Sufficient for us
will be the achievement, to reduce the past to order and certainty; and that this is
within our reach cannot be a matter of doubtful speculation.
J. STORY, On the Progress of Jurisprudence (Address to the Suffolk Bar Association, 1821),
in MISCELLANEOUS WRITNGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 238 (1852), quoted in Gilmore, supra
note 285, at 476 n.30.
291. See Gilmore, supra note 3, at 461.
292. A preference for contextual decisionmaking on a case-by-case basis need not de-
pend on exaggerated expectations of judicial infallibility. True, legal implications are more
likely to be perceived accurately in the actual circumstances of litigated cases than in the
hypothetical speculation that necessarily attends legislative drafting. But even if courts
and legislators err with equal frequency, the zone of exposure created by judicial error is
clearly narrower and more readily correctable than that created by legislative error.
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9 but also of the nature of the underlying Article 2 transaction, the
structure adapts. The Uniform Commercial Code, even in Article 9, is
sufficiently open-textured that it can be interpreted, in the common
law tradition, as a "case-law Code" of vital importance to a continuously
changing world..
2 93
293. The term "case-law Code" is Professor Gilmore's, which he used to describe what
he perceived to be the ideal of Karl Llewellyn in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code.
Gilmore, supra note 286, at 814-15:
It was, I believe, Karl's non-systematic, particularizing cast of mind and his case-
law orientation which gave to the statutes he drafted, and particularly to the Code,
their profound originality .... His instinct appeared to be to draft in a loose, open-
ended style; his preferred solutions turned on questions of fact (reasonableness, good
faith, usage of trade) rather than on rules of law. He had clearly in mind the idea
of a case-law Code: one that would furnish guide-lines for a fresh start, would ac-
commodate itself to changing circumstances, would not so much contain the law as
free it for a new growth. . . . I have come to feel that Karl saw more clearly than
his critics and that the Code as he initially conceived it might better have served the
purposes of the next fifty years.
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